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Incidents of abuse by U.S. service members, even if few and far between, have nearly 
irreversible impacts on the United States, including straining foreign relations, decreasing 
public support of U.S. policy, and negating counterterrorism efforts. A lot of research 
exists to discover why individuals participate in abuse, but little is known why 
individuals report abuse. This thesis looks at various models and their subcomponent 
elements from four bodies of literature: psychology; terrorist engagement; terrorist 
disengagement, deradicalization, and non-radicalization; and gang involvement, to better 
understand the disparate behavior between abusers and whistleblowers. After extracting 
applicable elements, a preliminary model to explain the difference between abusers and 
whistleblowers is formed, and then tested comparatively against two case studies: the My 
Lai massacre, and the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. The preliminary model is then 
discarded of elements that failed to explain the differences in behavior, leaving a final 
model. Measures to deter abuse and encourage reporting are then derived from this final 
model, leaving the reader with an enhanced understanding of not just why individuals 
participate in abuse, but why, under relatively similar conditions, others actively stop or 
report the abuse.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
 Two of the most controversial conflicts involving the United States were the 
Vietnam War (1955–1975) and the War in Iraq (2003–2011). Among other controversies, 
incidents of inhumane violence committed by U.S. military personnel came to public 
attention, specifically the My Lai massacre1 and the Abu Ghraib prison scandal.2  Many 
blamed the incidents on “a few bad apples,” but upon further investigation, the offenders 
were seemingly ordinary Americans showing no signs of potential to commit evil.   
Since the My Lai massacre, many scholars and organizations—including the 
Department of Defense—have studied how to prevent this kind of abuse. The Office of 
Naval Research, for example, sponsored the famous Stanford Prison Experiment, which 
raised awareness about the possibility of abuse in institutional and organizational 
settings.3  Still, decades later, a whistleblower revealed similar abuses by the U.S. 
military at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Were the abuses at Abu Ghraib a failure to 
learn from the consequences of My Lai, or are there other elements yet to be discovered 
that can aid in the prevention and interruption of illegal and immoral abuse by U.S. 
military members?  Perhaps a more important question relating to My Lai and Abu 
Ghraib is why was it that some military personnel committed atrocities, others did 
nothing, and a small handful objected?  This thesis asks the questions, why do some 
individuals in the U.S. military engage in inhumane violence, while others stand by or 
actively object under the same conditions?  More specifically, how can we identify 
                                                 
1 On March 16, 1968, a group of U.S. Army soldiers, while on patrol in the Vietnamese village of My 
Lai, murdered several hundred non-combatants including women, children, and old men. More details of 
the incident are included in later chapters.   
2 In late 2003, the media reported ongoing abuse at the Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq. Pictures were 
revealed of U.S. Army soldiers, both men and women, engaging in inhumane treatment of detainees, 
including forced nudity, sexual abuse, and other forms of unauthorized torture. More details of the incident 
are included in later chapters.  
3 “Stanford Prison Experiment, Frequently Asked Questions,” accessed 2 October, 2014, 
http://www.prisonexp.org/faq.htm. 
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conditions conducive to abuse and encourage individuals to prevent or stop abuse at its 
earliest stages? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The significance of these research questions is twofold. First, it is vitally 
important for the U.S. military to understand why uniformed personnel continue to 
occasionally engage in illegal and immoral actions such as those conducted at My Lai 
and Abu Ghraib. As a world hegemon, the United States must do everything possible to 
ensure that its military operates according to the rule of law and the Uniformed Code of 
Military Justice. But there is a second reason why this research is important, and why it is 
critical to understand these issues today: incidents like the My Lai massacre and prisoner 
abuse at Abu Ghraib reduce American credibility and support around the world, which 
deteriorates our ability to combat terrorism and preserve American security both at home 
and abroad.   
Maintaining credibility as a state is imperative in counterterrorism operations. 
When U.S. military abuse occurs, there is an unaffordable loss in counterterrorism 
effectiveness, both at the domestic and the international level.4  At the domestic level, 
targeting non-combatants and inhumanely treating the enemy may anger human rights 
advocates and society in general as it severely violates American societal values. The 
repercussions of declining domestic support of foreign affairs can include budget cuts, 
more stringent legal restrictions, and less resources allocated to government 
counterterrorism operations. Likewise at the international level, abuse such as that at My 
Lai and Abu Ghraib is certainly not condoned by international human rights groups or 
partner and ally nations. Relationships between allies become strained and the critical 
support of locals where terrorist organizations operate diminishes. Additionally, the 
damage caused to the “enemy” is far from a victory. Inhumane abuse only incites more 
hatred from terrorist groups and further fuels their cause to continue violence against the 
United States.   
                                                 
4 Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 140.  
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So why do American military members carry out such atrocities?  Violent, 
indiscriminate behavior of this type is unlawful and against the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice of the United States, yet U.S. Armed Forces personnel still occasionally and 
deliberately engage and participate in it. What is worse is that most perpetrators 
subconsciously justify their actions, actions they might otherwise condone from an 
outside perspective. It is probable that they deployed without the intention to commit 
abuse. For example, Ronald Ridenhour, who nearly singlehandedly started the 
investigations into My Lai by writing numerous letters to Congress, said:  
Most of them had never been away from home before they went into the 
service. And they end up in Vietnam, going there many of them because 
they thought they were going to do something courageous on behalf of 
their country and they thought they were going to do something which 
they thought was in the American ideal- whatever that meant. But it didn’t 
mean slaughtering whole villages of women and children, innocent 
people. Or even people who weren’t innocent. It didn’t involve that…One 
of my friends when he told me about it said ‘you know, it was this Nazi 
kind of thing.’ And that’s exactly right. It was this Nazi kind of thing. We 
didn’t go there to be Nazis. At least none of the people I knew went there 
to be Nazis. I didn’t go there to be a Nazi.5  
Clearly a discrepancy existed between expected behavior and executed behavior, 
furthermore disproving the “bad apple” explanation that the offenders are inherently evil 
people. Understanding situational and psychological elements6 that led to the shocking 
incidents of My Lai and Abu Ghraib may assist in the prevention of future incidents and 
increase a state’s success in counterterrorism campaigns.    
On the other hand, researching why not everyone engages in the same behavior 
under the same situation can shed light on why abuse occurs and ways to prevent it. 
Although evidence is almost always present to indicate elements that could have 
reasonably prevented the abuse, incidents like My Lai and Abu Ghraib, even if 
infrequent, continue to happen around the world. A more recent example occurred in 
                                                 
5 Michael Bilton and Kevin Sim, Four Hours in My Lai (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), 371. 
6 The term “element” is used as a component of a larger model. This term may be referred to as 
something different, depending on the author. For example, Stanley Milgram refers to the components of 
his model as “conditions,” John Horgan calls them “factors,” Philip Zimbardo calls them “situational 
forces” or “social dynamics,” etc. 
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early 2010 when a small group of U.S. Army troops, dubbed “the Kill Team,” staged fake 
attacks so they could murder unarmed Afghan civilians.7  The first murder was of a 
young boy, around 15 years old: afterwards, the soldiers took trophy pictures with the 
boy’s body and cut off his pinky finger for a keepsake.8 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
It is worth knowing up front that a plethora of literature exists that analyzes and 
explains how situations like My Lai and Abu Ghraib occur; however, in examining the 
models and specific elements of why individuals behave abusively, we find there is a lack 
of literature on why other individuals are not abusive, and why some actively object to 
abuse. Regardless of this discrepancy, various bodies of literature exist that may offer 
useful insight to answering the research questions of this thesis.  
1. Psychology  
The first body of literature that sheds light on the thesis questions is work within 
the fields of psychology, specifically research involving the psychology of obedience and 
group psychology. After the horrible truth of the Holocaust came to light in the world, 
people struggled to understand how humans could do such terrible things, even though 
violence has plagued human history. Psychology has much to offer in understanding 
isolated incidents of abuse. The impacts of a group setting often have a profound impact 
on individual emotion and behavior. Several trademark experiments, especially the 
Stanford Prison Experiment and Stanley Milgram’s Shock Experiment, revealed 
astonishing aspects of individual behavior in social hierarchies.   
Although psychology is appropriate in explaining why seemingly ordinary and 
moral people engage in immoral and violent behavior, there is a relative lack of 
explanation of why not everyone is subject to evil behavior when in the same setting. 
                                                 
7 Mark Boal, “The Kill Team: How U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan Murdered Innocent Civilians,” 
Rolling Stone, March 27, 2011, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-kill-team-
20110327?page=3. 
8 Ibid.  
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Furthermore, this body of literature provides even less of an explanation for the 
difference in participators and bystanders from those that actively object. The question of 
“why are some, but not all subject to blind obedience?” gets little attention. Philip 
Zimbardo, director of the Stanford Prison Experiment, appears to offer the only research 
focusing on the majority of people that did not commit abuses. He claims that for every 
situation where people can become perpetrators of evil, they can also become heroes 
because it is a choice.9  Regardless of outside elements, situations conducive to abuse 
always boil down to an individual decision. Zimbardo’s advice is instead of teaching our 
children to not get involved and mind their own business, teach them to have a heroic 
imagination where they grow up waiting to someday be in a situation where they have the 
opportunity to stop abuse.10  Although this advice is plausible, it requires a long-term 
dedication to altering an entire society and changing the culture. Perhaps this change is 
possible, but it does not offer a solution in the near future, nor does it adequately explain 
how the whistleblowers of Abu Ghraib and My Lai differ from the bystanders and 
abusers.  
2. Terrorist Engagement 
A second body of literature that applies to this thesis is the work in terrorism 
studies that seeks to understand why people join terrorist groups and engage in terrorism, 
including “lone wolf” terrorism.11  Although there may be some overlap, this body of 
literature varies from the first in that it also considers other elements such as economics, 
politics, and more.12  Even if abuse by U.S. military personnel is not typically motivated 
by politics, economics, etc., the end result is violence, like terrorism. Understanding why 
individuals feel the need to resort to violence and engage in terrorism may help in 
                                                 
9Philip Zimbardo, “The Psychology of Evil,” Technology, Entertainment, and Design video, 23:10, 
February, 2008, http://www.ted.com/talks/philip_zimbardo_on_the_psychology_of_evil?language=en. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Lone wolf terrorism is a term referring to perpetrators of terrorism not affiliated with a particular 
terrorist organization. Lone wolf terrorists generally act as individuals or within very small groups.          
12 Several examples include Richard English’s book Terrorism: How to Respond and Rex Hudson’s 
Congressional Research Service report The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a 
Terrorist and Why? 
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understanding why U.S. military personnel occasionally resort to violence other than in a 
traditional combat role. Part of this body of literature includes the Rational Choice 
Theory (RCT). RCT originally developed to explain that committing crime is a result of 
the criminal’s thought process and what he or she believed to be a rational action.13  The 
RCT extends to terrorism. People resort to terrorism because, in their minds, it is the most 
rational and practical thing.14  Why else would mentally stable humans, as rational 
animals, act illogically?  RCT extrapolates to isolated acts of military abuse as well. It is 
natural for humans to justify their actions, whether it was LT Calley who gave orders to 
kill non-combatants at My Lai, the soldiers who felt they should follow those orders, or 
even the whistleblowers. Still, this body of literature does not in itself address why most 
people do not become terrorists, let alone answer the research questions of this thesis.  
3. Terrorist Deradicalization, Disengagement, and Non-radicalization 
Although deradicalization, disengagement,15 and non-radicalization16 are slightly 
different concepts, they are grouped together as one theoretical background for the sake 
of simplification. At first glance, deradicalization might not appear to apply to the Abu 
Ghraib and My Lai case studies because the U.S. Armed Forces are not generally 
categorized as a radical group; however, one could argue, as LCOL Robert Rielly does in 
his article “The Inclination for War Crimes,” that the beliefs and values of the individuals 
indeed changed,17 possibly classifying the individuals as radicals. For instance, if the 
soldiers that participated in the My Lai Massacre were asked, prior to their arrival in 
Vietnam, their thoughts on killing non-combatant women and children, including babies, 
                                                 
13 Ronald V. Clarke and Derek B. Cornish, “Modeling Offenders’ Decisions: A Framework for 
Research and Policy,” Crime and Justice 6 (1985): 147. 
14 John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2005), 81.  
15 Disengagement is changing behavior by refraining from violence and withdrawing from the 
organization affiliated with that violence (Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 81).   Deradicalization is 
the process of moderating one’s belief (Audrey Kurth Cronan, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the 
Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009) 9–13.)   
16 Non-radicalization is defined as “those who have been exposed to radical ideologies and even flirted 
with radical mindsets, but ultimately have rejected violence” according to R. Kim Cragin’s article 
“Resisting Violent Extremism.”   
17 Robert Rielly, “The Inclination for War Crimes,” Military Review: The Professional Journal of the 
U.S. Army LXXXIX, no. 3 (May-June 2003): 19. 
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they would most likely believe these actions immoral. Yet for whatever self-justifying 
reasons, the soldiers ended up behaving in ways they never would have condoned. It is 
this reason that deradicalization among terrorists may provide some useful insight in 
examining if and why the beliefs and morals of the participants of Abu Ghraib and My 
Lai changed, even though it does not explicitly address why people do not radicalize.     
As for much of the remaining research regarding individual and group 
disengagement, there is useful material that will pertain to the case studies of Abu Ghraib 
and My Lai. These incidents did, after all, come to an end. One of the leading authors of 
terrorist disengagement is John Horgan who has written several works on this subject. A 
lot of his research discusses counterterrorism campaigns and their rate of success 
however, his most useful model that pertains to this thesis discusses individual 
disengagement, such as dissatisfaction with a group, which could apply to generic group 
situations and can certainly apply to isolated acts of abuse.18  As with every body of 
literature thus far, this particular sub-category falls short of answering the research 
questions because it focuses on why people disengage once they are already engaged, not 
on the individuals that never engage in the first place.  
Lastly, non-radicalization seems to be a relatively new term coined by Kim 
Cragin. Cragin’s article “Resisting Violent Extremism: A Conceptual Model for Non-
Radicalization” appears to be the only piece of literature that specifically addresses why 
not all people radicalize.   Although specifically relating to terrorism, this particular work 
is possibly the closest to answering the thesis questions. Furthermore, Cragin’s elements 
of non-radicalization are not simply the absence of radicalization elements. They are their 
own set of elements which, if inversed, would not necessarily result in radicalization.19  
Cragin’s work, specifically her elements of non-radicalization will be tested against the 
My Lai and Abu Ghraib case studies later in this thesis.  
                                                 
18 Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, ed., Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective 
Disengagement (New York: Routledge, 2009), 17–29.   
19 R. Kim Cragin, “Resisting Violent Extremism: A Conceptual Model for Non-Radicalization,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 2 (2014): 338, doi:10.1080/09546553.2012.714820. 
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4. Gangs 
A fourth body of literature to consider is gang involvement. Similar to terrorist 
engagement, research exists regarding the circumstances of why individuals join gangs, 
taking into account economics, family dynamics, etc. For example, the article “Predictors 
of Gang Involvement: A Longitudinal Analysis of Data from the Mobile Youth Survey” 
determined that family cohesiveness typically reduces gang involvement.20 This finding 
could be analogous to service members’ separation from family when they are deployed. 
Major incidents such as My Lai and Abu Ghraib, after all, occurred away from U.S. soil. 
Additionally, nearly half of American gang members are under the age of eighteen.21  It 
may be of interest to look for correlation in age of leaders and age of members among 
gangs in relation to the age of the participators and “ring leaders” of Abu Ghraib and My 
Lai, as well as other elements. Still, literature regarding gang involvement, like the other 
bodies of literature, do not address why some U.S. military personnel participate in 
abuse, why some watch as bystanders, and why few actively object and stop the abuse.  
5. Primary Sources and Official Reports  
Lastly, there is a collection of primary sources and other literature that provides a 
detailed account of Abu Ghraib and My Lai.22 Although literature on these two case 
studies does not technically constitute its own body of literature, it is useful to examine 
the models formed from official investigations that explain why these incidents occurred. 
It is also beneficial to study first-hand accounts. In both case studies, first-hand accounts 
of the incidents are available in perspective of both offenders and objectors. Analyzing 
what each person’s perception is necessary in understanding the individual, situational, 
and institutional elements that led to the tragic outcomes. This understanding provides a 
                                                 
20 Jeremiah Jaggers and others, “Predictors of Gang Involvement: A Longitudinal Analysis of Data 
From the Mobile Youth Survey,” Journal of the Society for Social Work and Research 4, no. 3 (2013): 277.  
21 National Youth Gang Survey Analysis, National Gang Center, accessed January 11, 2015,  
http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/survey-analysis/demographics. 
22 Some examples include interviews with the participators of Abu Ghraib and My Lai, such as 
Lynndie England and William Calley, respectively. Other sources provide the findings of the investigative 
committees and reports, such as the “Fay Report” in The Torture Papers. 
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gateway for identifying situations conducive to abuse as well as potential preventative 
measures through understanding of why U.S. service members engage and refuse to 
engage. A couple of relevant first-hand accounts, for example, are interviews with some 
of the participators of My Lai. One can see what each person’s predominate “excuse” 
was for killing innocent non-combatants. One man said Second Lieutenant (2LT) Calley 
threatened to kill him if he did not kill the My Lai villagers. Another clearly dehumanized 
the victims by explaining that “the Vietnamese are funny people…you can’t understand 
what they are thinking. They don’t care if they live or die.”23  Individual first-hand 
accounts of Abu Ghraib also reveal a lot about the situation, such as in Aiden Delgado’s 
book, Sutras of Abu Ghraib where the author describes his experiences and how he saw 
boredom turn into loneliness and depression.24  He also reveals the escalation of violence 
that took place, such as shooting stray dogs for sport.25 
As mentioned above, in addition to first-hand accounts are official reports and 
analysis specifically relating to My Lai and Abu Ghraib. The Peers Inquiry, for example, 
generates a handful of elements that LCOL Robert Rielly wrote of as useful measures of 
assessment in determining environments conducive to abuse, in which preemptive 
measures can be implemented. He fails, however, to describe what these preemptive 
measures should be. Additionally, Rielly’s article, “The Inclination for War Crimes,” 
summarizes Lieutenant General (LTG) Peers’ findings and concludes that leaders should 
evaluate if their subordinates can question ambiguous or unclear orders and be aware that 
values can change in combat.26  The problem with this conclusion is that not all abuses 
generate from unlawful orders. Furthermore, values do not change that easily. Most, if 
not all actions, even abusive ones, are self-justified in order to fit one’s values. It is 
unlikely, for example, that any of the abusers of My Lai or Abu Ghraib changed their 
values to believe in inhumane violence and murder. Rather, their actions were self-
                                                 
23“Interviews With My Lai Veterans 002,” YouTube video, 9:51, posted by “Ryan Plant,” December 
1, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LDAd8i7dAWs. 
24 Aiden Delgado, Sutras of Abu Ghraib: Notes From a Conscientious Objector in Iraq (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2007), 34–35. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Rielly, “Inclination for War Crimes,” 21.  
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justified, such as believing a detainee at Abu Ghraib was a terrorist with key information, 
or that an old man killed in My Lai supported the Viet Cong and posed a threat if left 
alive. Additionally, Reilly’s article simply fails to explain why some individuals did not 
participate in My Lai, or why CWO Thompson stopped the murders. Answering this 
question was likely absent from Rielly’s intent; however, the point is that much of the 
analysis about My Lai and Abu Ghraib regards why and how the events happened, but 
does not answer why not everyone participated. The specific elements from the Peers 
Inquiry that Reilly discusses will be analyzed in later chapters.  
Like the Peers Inquiry, which does not answer the research questions of this 
thesis, the reports from Abu Ghraib fail to provide answers as well. The report that most 
closely answers this question is the Schlesinger Report, specifically Appendix G, or 
“psychological stresses.”  This appendix heavily relies on the theoretical background of 
general psychology to explain the abuses at Abu Ghraib, including a synopsis of 
Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment. The closest the appendix comes to 
acknowledging the disparate behavior between participators and abusers is the attribution 
to “elements that can assist in predicting human aggression,” specifically, personality 
traits, which the appendix describes as “certain traits among the totality of an individual’s 
behavioral and emotional make-up predispose to be more aggressive than other 
individuals.”27  The only other elements in the report that relate to a difference in 
individual behavior are beliefs, attitudes, and values. These, however, are not substantial 
enough to answer the research questions. Simply attributing violence to the difference in 
individual disposition supports the “bad apple” notion that some people are inherently 
more evil than others. Perhaps this is true, but it proves a weak argument when the 
abusers are seemingly “good” people with religious roots, patriotic values, and positive 
attitudes.    
With a synopsis of the various bodies of literature, one can see how the research 
questions of this thesis go unanswered; however, this is not to say each body of literature 
does not have anything to contribute. Several models in each body of literature are 
                                                 
27 “The Schlesinger Report,” in The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, ed. Karen J. Greenberg 
and Joshua L. Dratel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 971.  
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discussed even further when specific elements are extracted for a comparative analysis 
against the Abu Ghraib and My Lai case studies.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
With the various bodies of literature relating to this thesis, it seems as though a 
hybrid of elements from various models will assist in understanding why some U.S. 
military personnel participate in abuse while some individuals, at the opposite end of the 
spectrum, object. I expect to find that the elements explaining the difference in behavior 
derive from primarily the individual and his or her background, but also from the 
institution and policies of the institution as well. In these cases, the institution is the 
military. 
For each case study, there is value in discovering the elements that led to the 
difference in behavior of the participators and objectors. I expect that the elements will be 
similar if not the same between each case. Why did William Calley order his 
subordinates to kill noncombatants in My Lai while Hugh Thompson demanded that they 
stop?  Why did so many U.S. Soldiers at Abu Ghraib participate in prisoner abuse but 
only a few did something to stop it?  I believe a hybrid of elements such as upbringing, 
roles within the institution, levels of isolation, age, oversight, and more will all prove 
influential in the variation of behavior. If the reasons for the disparate behaviors are 
identified, then the ability to prevent isolated acts of abuse by U.S. military personnel is 
enhanced.   
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis analyzes two case studies: the My Lai Massacre and Abu Ghraib 
prison scandal. From each body of literature, one or two prominent models are broken 
down into elements. Elements that are predicted to be applicable are aggregated into a 
table and applied to each case study with the intention of enhancing understanding of 
why some U.S. service members participate in abuse, why some observe, and why some 
object.   
 12 
First and foremost, the case studies are limited to incidents involving abuse by 
U.S. military personnel. These incidents were unforeseen and relatively isolated events, 
meaning that “normal and good” people ended up in these situations and served as either 
an authority figure giving directions, a participator, a bystander, or an objector to abuse. 
Each case will include a comparison of individuals in these roles in an attempt to identify 
causal differences in behavior.   
Additionally, there is intent to focus on case studies where the offenders, prior to 
entering the environment that relatively quickly developed into one of abuse, most likely 
had no foresight of themselves committing illegal and inhumane violence. One could 
reasonably question why Nazi Germany is not a case study. The reason for omission is 
because it was the entire state under the Nazi regime that conducted inhumane abuse and 
violence. One might find it doubtful that the U.S. would ever become something similar 
to Nazi Germany; however, isolated incidents such as My Lai and Abu Ghraib, even if 
few and far between, still have huge impacts and are worth analyzing rather than 
applying the “few bad apples” explanation.   
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Following the introduction of this thesis, Chapter II will provide background 
information on both the My Lai Massacre and the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. Chapter III 
includes a description of select models from each body of literature including the models’ 
subcomponents, or elements. Chapter IV has two stages of analysis per element. The first 
stage is to determine which elements from which models are applicable to the case 
studies. The second stage is testing the elements that appear applicable against the case 
studies to determine if they can provide answers into why some U.S. service members 
participate in abuse while others actively object. Elements that are deemed unfit or 
inapplicable will have brief mention only to make the reader aware of their existence. 
Chapter V concludes  the analysis from Chapter IV in the form of a model leaving the 
reader with an enhanced, even if slightly, insight and understand into why not all U.S. 
service members participate in abuse when under the same conditions, and why some 
actively stop the abuse. Chapter V will also offer potential preventative measures that 
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utilize the formulated model by identifying elements conducive to whistleblowing and 
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II. THE CASE STUDIES 
Prior to searching for and building an appropriate model to explain why some 
U.S. service members participate in abuse while others actively object, it is imperative to 
have a solid understanding of the case studies that are used to test various models. The 
details in this chapter will provide the reader with an adequate background of the 
complexity of the situation leading up to abuse, as well as the key participants in the case 
studies including both the abusers and whistleblowers. Without this background, one 
cannot fully understand the case studies and how they can help answer the research 
questions of this thesis.   
A. MY LAI 
After WWII came to an end, the United States immediately jumped into a war of 
another kind: the Cold War. Although an ally with the United States throughout WWII, 
the Soviet Union quickly grew as a threat along with its aggressive spread of 
communism. The U.S. government adopted a foreign policy based on the “domino 
theory,” which supported that communism would spread via a chain reaction amongst 
neighboring states of communist nations.28   
1. Background: The Vietnam War and an Elusive Enemy 
The domino theory along with the Northern Vietnamese proclamation of 
independence from France, the U.S. feared that the total loss of Vietnam to communism 
would serve as the gateway for communism to spread to Southeast Asia and Indochina.29  
The U.S. believed that action was critical if communism were to be contained, so 
beginning in 1962, U.S. advisors began to assist the South Vietnamese government in 
fighting the communist Viet Cong (VC).30  By 1965, President Johnson (1963-1969) 
                                                 
28 “Domino Theory.” Cold-War. Accessed June 8, 2015. http://www.history.com/topics/ cold-
war/domino-theory. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Bilton, Four Hours, 25. 
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ordered for combat troops to deploy.31  After hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops and 
billions of dollars were poured into the conflict, Americans were abruptly shocked to 
learn that victory was not so easy. Many questioned how one of the most powerful and 
advanced militaries could have such difficulty defeating a primitive group of people.32  
The VC were not a separate military entity like U.S. forces; rather, they were an 
extension of the villages they grew up in. In most cases, the entire village population 
knew of the complex system of underground tunnels and booby traps used to evade and 
fight Americans, respectively. The VC blended in with village life, severely blurring the 
line of distinction between combatants and non-combatants.33  Those directly involved 
quickly realized that an end was far away and creating a policy to successfully defeat the 
VC would prove difficult and controversial.   
2. Task Force Barker  
Quang Ngai, a province in northern South Vietnam, has a historical background 
of resistance to outside influence in which the surrounding areas were subject to.34  This 
province was a known stronghold for the VC and an American victory there would 
provide a strategic advantage in the war against communism. Upon its arrival in 
December of 1967, the 11th Brigade was assigned operational control of the Southeast 
sector of Quang Ngai.35  Within its operational control, the 11th Brigade divided its forces 
to further delegate control into areas of operation (AOR). Due to a lack of full manning, 
Colonel Oran Henderson, 11th Brigade Commander created an ad hoc task force under 
Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker to control the Eastern subsector of the 11th Brigade area 
of operation.36 
                                                 
31 Bilton, Four Hours, 25. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 30. 
34 W.R. Peers, The My Lai Inquiry (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1979), 37. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 39. 
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After several engagements between Task Force Barker (TFB) and the VC, the VC 
seemed to evade to the south of TFB’s AOR. Permission was requested and granted for 
TFB to expand their operations south of their AOR, which was controlled by a South 
Vietnamese Division, the 2nd Army of Vietnam Division (ARVN); here lay the hamlet of 
My Lai.37  In mid-February of 1968, TFB conducted a 3-day operation into My Lai, 
resulting in the death of eighty VC and 3 Americans.38  In late February 1968, another 
operation was launched in My Lai, ending with similar results: seventy-five VC and 3 
Americans dead.39  TFB would receive orders for one final assault into My Lai.  
3. The Orders 
Ambiguous orders began from COL Henderson, encouraging LCOL Barker and 
his commanders to be aggressive and close rapidly on the enemy.40  Charlie Company 
was to carry out the main assault prior to artillery preparation while Alpha Company 
provided a blockade to the North and Bravo Company would sweep through afterwards 
and later join with Charlie Company.41  Intelligence indicated that the entire population 
in My Lai was VC or at least VC sympathizers.42  At the time of the next day’s 
operation, the villagers would be at Quang Ngai City at the markets, but the remaining 
VC would still out-number Charlie Company and provide a strong enemy resistance 
according to intelligence.43  After the three companies of TFB received their orders, each 
broke off for further briefing. Captain Earnest Medina, Charlie Company commander 
gathered the entire company and described the search-and-destroy mission that would 
take place the following morning. First and second platoons would move through My Lai 
taking down the VC and destroying livestock, crops, and houses. Third platoon would 
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follow through to “mop up.”44  Because all civilians were expected to be at the markets, 
no instructions were given on how to deal with civilians if they were encountered. Any 
prisoners and VC suspects were to be turned over to the respective platoon commander 
for screening.45   CAPT Medina’s brief concluded with a solemn reminder of the Charlie 
Company men who had been lost to the enemy in recent days; he ensured that tomorrow 
would be their chance to get revenge.46 
4. The Massacre 
Indiscriminate killing began first thing on the morning of March 16th when U.S. 
artillery troops blindly fired a barrage of artillery toward My Lai. The initial purpose was 
to clear a landing zone for the helicopters and insertion of Charlie Company; however, 
the careless demeanor resulted in artillery landing in the Son My village.47  When Charlie 
Company of TFB landed they found a lack of enemy fire and a quiet land scarce of its 
frightened inhabitants; a scene quite contradictory to what they were expecting base on 
the previous day’s brief. The few Vietnamese that were around were immediately mowed 
down with machine gun fire, including a farmer who waved his arms in a non-threatening 
manner to show he was unarmed.48  After an uneventful landing, CAPT Medina radioed 
a false report that 15 VC were killed.49  The next task for Charlie Company was to spend 
the remainder of the morning destroying the Son My village in My Lai.50   
As first and second platoons split into squads, which split into smaller groups, the 
soldiers began to destroy the village in an unorganized manner. What started as a calm 
and controlled environment quickly spiraled out of control. Patrolling for the enemy 
escalated to shooting anything and everything that moved, miraculously excluding each 
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45 Bilton, Four Hours, 110. 
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47 Bilton, Four Hours, 105. 
48 Ibid., 108–109. 
49 Ibid., 109. 
50 Ibid., 98. 
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other. Some soldiers later described how baffled they were that no friendly fire occurred 
amongst the chaotic killing spree.51   
Contrary to intelligence, a large number of villagers were still present in My Lai. 
As some soldiers gathered up groups of women, old men, and children of all ages as 
prisoners, other soldiers shot them down with machine guns. Women were violently 
raped and many villagers were scalped, had their tongues cut out, or were inhumanely 
mutilated in other ways. Prior to burning down houses, some soldiers would attempt to 
remove any inhabitants while others would throw a grenade in regardless of the 
occupants. Likewise, a few soldiers tended to the wounded noncombatants while others 
followed behind shooting the wounded dead and wasting any previous first aid 
attempts.52  
The actions of many soldiers in My Lai clearly indicated the free-for-all, 
unstructured nature of the operation. Ultimately, however, the behavior of the men of 
Charlie Company boiled down to individual choices and actions. Some soldiers opted not 
to kill anyone, while others violently tortured and killed unarmed noncombatants of all 
ages and genders. For some, the choice to not participate in the slaughter came at a price: 
during the long morning operation, a group of village men, women, and children were 
rounded up into an area by two soldiers from first platoon. Just prior to this, first platoon 
commander, Lieutenant William Calley, received a radio query from CAPT Medina, who 
was staying back with third platoon, waiting to conduct a final sweep after first and 
second platoons finished the initial offensive. CAPT Medina wanted to know what was 
taking so long.  2LT Calley, nervous and known for his weakness as a leader, reported 
that first platoon ran into a group of civilians. CAPT Medina ordered 2LT Calley to get 
rid of them, and in turn, 2LT Calley ordered the two men to “take care of them.”53  The 
two soldiers interpreted this order to mean watch over the group, so as they stood there 
guarding, 2LT Calley, in an agitated manner, clarified he wanted the group of villagers 
killed. After one soldier initially refused, 2LT Calley, stressed and angry, aggressively 
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53 Ibid., 120. 
 20 
ordered the soldier to shoot when he gives the command to fire.  2LT Calley and the two 
soldiers spent multiple magazines each, killing the group of villagers in a matter 
seconds.54  Shortly later, 2LT Calley stumbled across another group of villagers gathered 
up by two other soldiers, who were keeping watch over the group and playing with the 
children.  2LT Calley ordered the two soldiers to kill them all. When one of the soldiers, 
Robert Maples, refused, LT Calley turned his rifle on Maples. After a few of the other 
soldiers came to Maple’s defense by blocking him from 2LT Calley, 2LT Calley backed 
off and commenced killing the group of villagers with the help of another soldier.55  2LT 
Calley and his platoon continued on. A mere few hours after Charlie Company’s arrival 
in My Lai, hundreds of unarmed Vietnamese men, women, and children were mutilated, 
tortured, and slaughtered; not one enemy bullet fired; and not one VC killed.       
Meanwhile, Chief Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson began his reconnaissance 
mission tracking down two VC who were apprehended for interrogation.56  After this 
initial stop, CWO Thompson continued his reconnaissance mission without seeing any 
more VC. Through think smoke, CWO Thompson was able to drop green smoke markers 
near several wounded villagers. After returning from refueling, he began to question the 
operations on the ground as he saw that the wounded were now dead, in addition to many 
water buffalo and other livestock.57  Dropping elevation for a closer look, CWO 
Thompson and his 2-man crew saw a wounded woman that he previously marked lay 
partially in a dike as a U.S. Captain walked up to her, nudged her with his foot, then 
killed her; CWO Thompson was astounded.58  CWO Thompson then landed his 
helicopter, stepped out, and asked one of the ground soldiers what he could do to help the 
wounded. The soldier replied that the only way to help was to put the wounded out of 
their misery.59  Just then, 2LT Calley approached CWO Thompson and CWO Thompson 
questioned what was going on.  2LT Calley replied that he was in charge of the ground 
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troops and what happened was not CWO Thompson’s business.60  Frustrated and upset, 
CWO Thompson got back into his helicopter and as he took off, witnessed the ground 
troops killing the remaining villagers in the dike.61  CWO Thompson then came across a 
group of villagers, including children, running into a bunker followed by U.S. soldiers 
who were clearly set on killing them. CWO Thompson landed his helicopter between the 
ground soldiers and the bunker and ordered his crew to open fire on U.S. troops if they 
started shooting the villagers. CWO Thompson coaxed the villagers out of the bunker and 
had the “gunships,” Huey helicopters, land and take the villagers to safety. One of CWO 
Thompson’s crew members rescued a young child who lay in a dike clearly in shock. The 
gunships and CWO Thompson’s helicopter took off. After flying the young child to the 
nearest hospital, CWO Thompson refueled and returned to LZ Dottie where he 
emotionally reported the atrocities. At this time, CAPT Medina and third platoon began 
their “mop up” operations through My Lai, continuing to kill surviving villagers and 
livestock in an inhumane manner. By the time the news of the senseless killing got to 
LCOL Barker, LCOL Barker ordered an inquiry to CAPT Medina, who requested the 
mission be changed from search and destroy to search and clear.62  For the rest of the 
day, CAPT Medina ensured no more civilians were harmed as third platoon continued to 
make its way through My Lai. The massacre in My Lai finally ended, and so did any talk 
of it, that is, until Ron Ridenhour started asking questions.  
Ron Ridenhour was a reconnaissance helicopter gunner, just like that of CWO 
Thompson’s crew. Although he was not a member of Charlie Company, he flew a 
mission over My Lai days after the massacre and witnessed the morbid aftermath.63  
After talking with his friends from Charlie Company, Ron Ridenhour sensed that the 
tragedy was covered up and began to write letters to Congress upon his eventual return 
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home.64  Finally, the tragic secrets of My Lai began to surface as information and 
photographs leaked to the media and as the Peers Commission formed to investigate.        
B. ABU GHRAIB 
Abu Ghraib is another notorious incident of abuse by U.S. service members, 
causing wounds that the world has yet to heal from. Sadly, this abuse naturally followed 
in the wake of the largest terrorist attack on the United States: 9/11. A misunderstanding 
of 9/11 and the chaos that ensued for years to come is to misunderstand Abu Ghraib as 
well.     
1. Background: September 11, 2001 
At 8:45 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, the morning of September 11th, 2001 
appeared as the beginning of a normal bustling day in New York City. At 8:46 a.m., the 
mundane morning drastically changed as American Airlines Flight 11 flew at high speed 
into the north tower of the World Trade Center. The next 18 minutes were filled with 
assumptions and reports of an accidental crash. Once United Airlines Flight 175 flew into 
the south tower of the World Trade Center, the world knew that the United States was 
under a full blown terrorist attack. Fighter jets were scrambled from multiple locations 
and given authority to shoot down passenger aircraft reported as hijacked.65  Before the 
United States could muster up adequate air defense, American Airlines Flight 77 flew 
into the Pentagon, and United Airlines Flight 93 crashed into a Pennsylvania field after a 
heroic attempt by its passengers to relinquish control from the hijackers.66  Less than two 
hours later, both towers of the World Trade Center had completely collapsed ultimately 
ending the tragedy with a death toll of 2,977 lives.67 
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Even before the attack on the Pentagon, the Bush Administration had determined 
that the terrorist attacks were attributable to Al Qaeda,68 an Islamic fundamental terrorist 
organization formed in the late 1980s with roots throughout the world, but predominately 
in Afghanistan.69  As intelligence began to connect all of the dots in hindsight, fear of 
more attacks quickly spread around the world.   
The pressure for the United States to react and impose sanctions on those 
involved was nearly immediate. NATO unanimously activated Article Five of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, declaring the attack on the United States as an attack on all NATO 
members.70  Most nations seemed to agree with the German Chancellor, Gerhard 
Schroeder, that the attacks were “a declaration of war against the civilized world.”71  The 
civilized world was going to war and the United States was expected to be the vanguard 
of the affair.  
2. The War on Terror 
On the evening of 9/11 and in the following days, President George W. Bush 
addressed the attacks on television. Most Americans had never heard of Al Qaeda and 
questioned why a group of people would inflict unthinkable violence on innocent lives.  
“Why do they hate us?” became the cliché question. President Bush answered that 
question, claiming “our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom” was attacked 
because it was “the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.”72  This 
answer implanted the notion that the only people that would attack innocent and free 
American lives were inherently evil an irrational beings, which only diminished the 
ability to effectively understand and create successful counterterrorism policy.  
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This new war, a “monumental struggle of good versus evil,” as President Bush 
declared,73 needed an official name. Several titles were considered, such as “a War on 
Radical Islam” and “a War on Islamic Extremism,” but ultimately what stuck was the 
“Global War on Terror.”74  This title seemed generic enough for the elusive “evil” that 
the world was at war with: evil that was comprised of a complex nexus of ill-structured 
terrorist organizations and the states which, sometimes unofficially, supported them.75 
Less than a month after 9/11, the first phase of the Global War on Terror began 
with Operation Enduring Freedom with the intent to defeat Al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
regime of Afghanistan which strongly supported Al-Qaeda.76  After things were 
reportedly going well, the United States pressed on to invade Iraq in March of 2003 for 
ambiguous reasons that would create controversy not only among the American 
population, but also elsewhere in the world. President Bush explained the reason for U.S. 
action in Iraq: “American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military 
operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave 
danger.”77  The reality was that the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that Iraq 
allegedly possessed was based on faulty intelligent,78 leaving many to believe that access 
to oil was the real reason for the invasion.79  The lack of support for U.S. policy 
strengthened the hatred of U.S. occupation in the Middle East. Middle Eastern animosity 
of a U.S. presence in Iraq was at an all-time high, adding to the stress and fervor of the 
War on Terror.  
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3. The Elusive Enemy and an Undefined Mission 
The international community as well as the majority of U.S. citizens supported 
action against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Iraq was another story. To some, 
the U.S. invasion of Iraq seemed like a natural progression of the Global War on Terror, 
which was, after all, a war against evil, according to President Bush. To others, albeit the 
objectives of the Global War on Terror were generic and vague, invading Iraq because of 
suspected WMD did not seem appropriate for the agenda of fighting terrorism despite the 
statement from President Bush that “the terrorist threat to American and the world will be 
diminished the moment that Saddam Hussein is disarmed.”80   
Upon arrival into Iraq, many U.S. troops did not know anything about the enemy, 
or even who the enemy was, only that someone had to pay for the atrocity of September 
11th. Furthermore, detainees in U.S. run prisons consisted of a mix of suspected terrorists, 
common criminals, and innocent people that were unfortunate enough to be in the wrong 
time and place during a dragnet raid.81  One major issue of indiscriminate detainment is 
that common criminals and terrorist suspects are under disparate legal categories. 
Terrorists, in particular, were not state actors and therefore did not fall under Geneva 
Convention protection according to the Bush Administration.82  With that said, suspected 
terrorist detainees were not afforded a POW status, furthermore blurring the line of how 
they should be treated. For example, a common conception was that some detainees were 
the “worst of the worst” and needed exposure to harsh interrogation techniques in order 
to extract information that would save lives.83  With an unknown enemy, it was easier, 
and safer, to assume that an individual was a terrorist or at least a supporter and the war, 
after all, was promised to continue until “every terrorist group of global reach has been 
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found, stopped, and defeated.”84  The ambiguous classification system of terrorists and 
definition of torture set the stage for an unstructured, chaotic, inefficient prison system 
with unorthodox interrogation methods. Some may see this environment as clearly 
conducive to the abuse that began to occur.    
4. The Prison System 
As with all conflicts with foreign entities, intelligence plays a vital role in 
developing and carrying out successful foreign policy. One major problem with the 
Global War on Terror was that the United States had underemphasized the threat in the 
Middle East.85  With this problem came the issue of lacking HUMINT.86  HUMINT is 
one of several means to gather intelligence, so without this capability, the U.S. had to rely 
heavily on SIGINT,87 or technological means of collecting intelligence.  
With an overreliance on SIGINT along with the complicated network of Al Qaeda 
and other supporting organizations, specific targets were difficult to identify and locate. 
This problem paved way for the solution of capturing “suspects” in a dragnet fashion.88  
U.S. troops would raid a village and detain locals on little or no basis of reasonable 
suspicion.89  As one would imagine, the dragnet detainment of mass amounts of people 
created yet another problem of space. The response to this problem was to utilize a 
complex prison system to hold detainees. 
Many prisons were established in Afghanistan and later Iraq as well as CIA secret 
prisons established in clandestine locations around the world; however, the manpower 
and resources to effectively run them was lacking.90  The large influx of detainees 
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contributed to the lack of detainee accountability; mixed with undermanned, stressed, 
fatigued, young soldiers with a lack of guidance, legal ambiguity and many other factors, 
the stage was set for prison abuse.   
Prisoner abuse was by no means isolated to the Abu Ghraib case. Abuse in U.S. 
foreign prisons occurred years before in Afghanistan. One of the more published cases 
was the violent deaths of two Afghan inmates in the U.S. detention facility in Bagram, 
Afghanistan. Some of the interrogators at Bagram were reported to have redeployed to 
Iraq and served as interrogators at Abu Ghraib.91  A couple of years into the Afghanistan 
campaign, the war in Iraq began without missing a beat, as did U.S.-run prison systems 
due to the same lack of HUMINT in Afghanistan.92 
5. Abu Ghraib 
Abu Ghraib had a reputation of its own long before U.S. occupation, as it was one 
of the most infamous torture compounds under Saddam Hussein’s rule.93  Located 
between Falluja, Ramadi, and the Sunni suburbs in Western Bagdad, Abu Ghraib was the 
most targeted U.S. occupied location in Iraq, frequently under mortar attack from 
locals.94  This was one of many factors that put both Iraqi and U.S. occupants on edge. 
Additionally, the ramp up of U.S. raids to find terrorist suspects resulted in a large 
population of incoming detainees, further adding to the poor and stressful conditions that 
both the detainees and MP’s lived with on a daily basis.95    
The afternoon of November 7th, 2003 marked the beginning of one of the worst 
abuses committed by U.S. service members. The conflict began with a small riot over 
food in the Camp Ganci compound where alleged common criminals resided.96  These 
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small riots fueled other detainees and before long dozens of detainees were participating, 
throwing rocks and bricks, one of them hitting a female MP in the face.97  The MP’s 
were able to quell the riot and identify seven detainees as the instigating group.98  That 
evening, the seven alleged instigators were taken to Tier1A, or the “hard-site”99 – an 
isolated section of the prison compound where high value intelligence targets were 
detained and interrogated. 
As the seven hooded and frightened detainees were relocated to Tier1A, a group 
of U.S. soldiers from the 372nd MP Company awaited their arrival. Among these soldiers 
were SSG Ivan Frederick, noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) of the hard-site; 
SPC Jeremy Sivits, one of the company’s mechanics who offered to help SSG Frederick 
relocate the detainees; SPC Matthew Wisdom; CPL Charles Graner, the NCOIC of 
Tier1A and later infamously referred to as the ring leader of Abu Ghraib; SPC Sabrina 
Harman; SGT Javal Davis; SSG Robert Elliot; SFC Shannon Snider; SPC Megan 
Ambhul; and SPC Lynndie England, one of the company’s file clerks who was not 
authorizes to handle detainees, but had an extramarital relationship with CPL Graner and 
would frequently visit Tier1A during the night shift.100  Some soldiers parted ways to 
carry on other duties while some stayed behind. Nearly immediately the abuse began as 
the detainees were pushed into a pile on the compound floor. After reviewing the 
information on the detainees, SPC Harman with CPL Graner’s assistance ripped off the 
bottom half of one detainee’s jumpsuit and wrote “I’m a rapeist” on the detainee, 
humoring the other soldiers at her misspelling.101   
The abuse continued as SGT Davis and SPC England stomped on the detainees’ 
bare fingers and feet, with 220 pound SGT Davis pausing to jump on the group of 
detainees. At this point, SPC Wisdom attempted to object questioning what would 
happen if the detainees were injured. SPC Wisdom’s interjection was disregarded. CPL 
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Graner then posed for pictures as if he were about to punch one of the detainees in the 
head. SPC Harman and SPC England snapped away on their cameras and CPL Graner 
proceeded to punch a detainee in the temple, knocking him unconscious.102  SSG 
Frederick then punched a detainee in the chest, leaving the man struggling to breathe.103  
At this point, SPC Wisdom was quite uncomfortable with the situation and left to report it 
to his team leader, SGT Robert Jones, who dismissed SPC Wisdom’s testimony as a 
misunderstanding of interrogation procedures that he witnessed.104 
Meanwhile in Tier1A, physical abuse escalated to sexual abuse as the detained 
men were stripped naked and forced to pose as though they were riding each other with 
SPC England jumping in the picture with a thumbs up. The next pose became 
internationally notorious as the detainees were forced to climb into a pyramid. After the 
soldiers had enough entertainment taking pictures of that pose, they then made the 
detainees stand against the wall and masturbate. It just turned midnight, marking SPC 
England’s 21st birthday. Again, SPC England posed with the humiliated men and CPL 
Graner attributed the scene to SPC England: “Here’s your birthday present” he said to 
her.105  By this time the only remaining soldiers were CPL Graner, SSGT Frederick, and 
SPC England. The three soldiers took the abuse one final step further and forced the 
detainees into positions that appeared as though they were participating in oral sex.106  
SPC Wisdom returned to Tier1A and witnessed this last abusive action of the night 
before going back to talk to SGT Jones, who later went to Tier1A after the abuse had 
ended, confronting SSGT Frederick. 
Months later, SGT Joseph Darby, another administrative person from the 372nd 
MP Company, asked CPL Graner for any pictures he had, intending to collect scenic 
photos and send them home. CPL Graner handed him two CD’s and after initial 
assumption that the photos were U.S. troops joking around, SGT Darby was horrified 
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when he realized that the naked, hooded men were not his company-mates, but rather 
detainees. The seriousness of the abhorrent behavior depicted in the photographs caused 
SGT Darby to think long and hard about turning the CD’s in. Ultimately, SGT Darby 
decided it was the right thing to do and turned the CD’s over to the Army’s Criminal 
Investigative Command (CID). CID quickly realized the gravity of the situation and 
launched an investigation, which uncovered incidents of abuse other than those on the 
night of November 7th, 2003. In October 2003, for example, SPC England was 
photographed standing in Tier1A with a collar and leash on a detainee lying on the 
floor107 – another infamous symbol of Abu Ghraib.  
As the horrific images of physical and sexual abuse circulated the Internet and 
other forms of media, SPC England, CPL Graner, SPC Sabrina Harman, SSG Frederick, 
and others became icons of a new revolution against America; a revolution that would 
and will continue to radicalize people, creating a perpetual terrorist threat against the U.S. 
and its allies.  
If one questions whether Abu Ghraib still mobilizes terrorists, then a look at 
recent news should provide an answer: one of the perpetrators of France’s Charlie Hebdo 
attack in January 2015 admits to becoming radicalized after watching the Abu Ghraib 
scandal unfold on television.108  Abu Ghraib created a long and bumpy road for those in 
the business of counterterrorism. Understanding why these abuses happened as well as 
how and why they were stopped is extremely beneficial to counterterrorism efforts as 
well as American foreign policy and diplomatic relationships with other nations.    
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III. A PRELIMINARY MODEL TO EXPLAIN PARTICIPATION 
IN ABUSE 
With the background of each case study explained, it is now time to develop a 
preliminary model to explain why some U.S. military personnel participate in atrocities 
and abuse, while others do not.  This preliminary model is built from specific factors, or 
elements, derived from various models that already exist within several bodies of 
literature, and the first step in this process is to examine those models that already exist.  
This chapter reviews models from the field of psychology; from studies of terrorist 
engagement, and terrorist disengagement; from the study of gangs; and from official 
studies that examined the My Lai and Abu Ghraib incidents.  Following this chapter, 
Chapter IV will draw out the factors and elements from each of these literatures that 
appear to be applicable and fundamental to this thesis, and will test those elements 
against the cases of My Lai and Abu Ghraib, resulting in a model which enhances the 
readers understanding of why some U.S. military personnel participate in abuse while 
others actively object.  
A. PSYCHOLOGY 
As briefly mentioned in Chapter I, two prominent experiments that led to 
breakthroughs in the field of psychology are Stanley Milgram’s Shock Experiment and 
Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment. Milgram’s experiment led to his model 
depicting the psychological elements of obedience and following orders and Zimbardo’s 
experiment is practically the Abu Ghraib Prison scandal, only decades earlier. Because of 
the experiments’ close correlation to the My Lai and Abu Ghraib case studies, Milgram 
and Zimbardo’s models are the selected models from psychology literature and are 
broken down into elements to determine each one’s applicability to the case studies.      
1. Stanley Milgram and the Shock Experiment 
In the 1960s, Stanley Milgram set up an experiment at Yale University regarding 
obedience and compliance. The experiment was advertised in a local newspaper and 
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volunteers from all walks of life responded. Per the advertisement, volunteers were to be 
paid $4 for one hour of their time.109  No contract was in place and no additional 
obligations were established. Volunteers were made to perceive the experiment as one 
involving memory improvement where the “teacher” would ask questions to a “learner” 
and if the learner did anything but answer right, the teacher was to administer a shock, 
each time progressively stronger. The experiment was rigged so the volunteer would 
always draw the straw to be the teacher.110  The learner was an actor who would not 
actually receive shocks.  
Milgram and other psychologists underestimated the power of obedience as the 
experiment revealed a surprisingly high number of participants who “shocked” the 
learner with shocks that not only appeared to caused the learner severe pain and 
discomfort, but ultimately resulted in the learner becoming unresponsive. As a result, 
Milgram authored a book called Obedience to Authority and built a model of what he 
called the “agentic state.”  Milgram defines the agentic state as the state a person is in 
when he seems himself as an agent to carry out another person’s wishes.111  Milgram’s 
model is split into three parts, each part with its own elements, totaling to 15 elements. 
The 3 parts of Milgram’s model are antecedent conditions causing someone to enter the 
agentic state, properties of the agentic state, and binding factors that keep someone in the 
agentic state. Since the research questions of this thesis are not concerned with resulting 
characteristics once an individual is already abusive, the portion of Milgram’s model 
“properties of the agentic state” are discarded in further analysis.112  The remaining 
applicable parts of Milgram’s model, antecedent conditions and binding factors, leaves 
10 elements to consider. These elements are: family, institutional setting, rewards, 
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perception of authority, entry into the authority system, coordination of command with 
the function of authority, overarching ideology, sequential nature of the action, situational 
obligations, and anxiety. These 10 elements could offer potential answers to why some 
U.S. service members participated in abuse at My Lai and Abu Ghraib, and why some 
actively objected.  
The first element of Milgram’s model to consider is family. Family, Milgram 
explains, typically teaches the individual from a very young age the importance of both 
obedience and morals.113   
The next element in Milgram’s model is institutional setting. Humans are 
naturally social animals and we instinctively recognize the need to cooperate with a 
larger society in order to survive and thrive. This sense of being a part of something 
bigger than one’s self is attributed to what Milgram calls the institutional setting. The 
institutional setting creates a phenomenon of conformity. An institution may be a job and 
the work place, or, in the case of My Lai and Abu Ghraib, the military.   
Milgram’s third element is rewards, such as promotions. Rewards not only 
provide individual motivation but also structural reinforcement of the institutional 
hierarchy.114  Although there were no rewards in Milgram’s experiment aside from a 
small cash reward that the participant could keep even if he stopped the experiment, the 
societal norm or rewards and incentive was still present. Specifically, society has instilled 
in individuals to “do what the man in charge says”115 and good things will come; if one 
does not, then consequences can be expected. In Milgram’s experiment, the experimenter 
was perceived to be the man in charge and some volunteers had satisfaction in pleasing 
the experimenter by following the experimenter’s orders, others felt that there was no 
reward to gain.   
The fourth element in Milgram’s paradigm is the perception of authority. As 
shown in Milgram’s experiment, the lab-coated experimenter with a serious demeanor 
                                                 




seemed to have a powerful authoritative force over the volunteers,116 even though there 
were no legal written or verbal oaths binding the volunteer to such obedience.   
Entry into the authority system is Milgram’s fifth element in his model, which 
relates to the previous element of perceiving authority. Along with the perception of a 
particular authority figure, is the perception of an authoritative system. The authority 
system is often correlated to physical space, as Milgram points out that his experiment 
was conducted in a laboratory; a space that was under the realm of the experimenter 
giving orders.117  Milgram believed that if the experiment occurred outside of the 
laboratory, obedience would drastically decrease.118   
The next element is what Milgram calls “coordination of command with the 
function of authority,” meaning that the orders must appear to have a general link to the 
organization119 and, from a military perspective, a link to the mission. Milgram identifies 
this phenomenon in his experiment when the volunteer considers the experimenter’s 
orders within context of the experiment. Furthermore, this context gives the authority 
figure more legitimacy: “Because the experimenter issues orders in a context he is 
presumed to know something about, his power is increased.”120   
The seventh element, and final element of the antecedent conditions portion of 
Milgram’s model, is overarching ideology that plays a vital role in justifying an 
individual’s behavioral compliance. For example, in Milgram’s experiment, the 
overarching ideology of the experiment is in the name of science and the volunteer’s 
participation ultimately benefits this ideology.121  
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The eighth element to examine in Milgram’s model, also the first element his 
binding factors portion is sequential nature. Sequential nature has two facets to it: 
quantity and quality. Abuse occurs at the end of the cliché “slippery slope.”  It is much 
easier for individuals to continue what they are doing rather than to do something new,122 
which closely coincides with the cliché that humans are “creatures of habit.”  
Additionally, humans naturally self-justify their actions. Self-image is diminished if one 
were to abruptly stop behaving a certain immoral way after behaving that way for so 
long. Instead, it is easier for one to continue through to the end, which provides easier 
justification for past behavior.123  An example is found in Milgram’s experiment where 
volunteers were hesitant to stop shocking the learner because disobeying would morally 
discredit the volunteer’s behavior thus far.124   
Milgram’s ninth element to consider is situational obligations. Milgram 
emphasizes this element because in his experiment, he found it alarming that the 
volunteers felt so obligated to apply. Individuals acted as though they were bound by the 
law to continue with the shocking experiment, particularly when the experimenter said 
“you are required to continue on with the experiment” after any objection by the 
volunteer.125  Milgram inferred that individuals are simply uncomfortable reneging on 
their commitment, even if there are no binding conditions or repercussions.126   
The final element that Milgram discusses is anxiety. Milgram defines anxiety as 
“vague apprehensions of the unknown,” including fear.127  The reader should note that 
the element of fear occurs in other models and will be grouped under the element of 
“anxiety.”  Milgram attributes anxiety, at least in the case of his shock experiment, to the 
strain between an individual’s values or beliefs and the desire to maintain social order.128  
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Anxiety was clearly displayed among Milgram’s volunteers as they exhibited trembling, 
anxious laughter, etc., when they were uncomfortable with the dilemma to stop harming 
the learner or to follow the orders of the experimenter.129  For the purpose of this 
analysis, anxiety will include any and all aspects identified, such as fear of disobeying an 
authority figure, fear of social repercussions, fear of legal repercussions, etc.   
2. Philip Zimbardo and the Stanford Prison Experiment 
In 1971, Philip Zimbardo, a professor of psychology at Stanford University, ran 
an experiment on prison abuse, ironically requested by the Department of Defense, 
specifically the Office of Naval Research.130  The experiment involved a group of 
students, profiled as normal, healthy, middle-aged males, half of which were randomly 
selected to act as prison guards and the other half selected as prisoners.131  What was 
supposed to be a several week long experiment came to an end after just five days; 
prisoner abuse from the guards escalated so quickly that prisoners began to display real 
and serious pathological distress.132  The shocking results of this experiment that seemed 
to engulf the participants including Zimbardo himself led to ground breaking discoveries 
situational forces, especially those in a prison setting. Decades later, Zimbardo was asked 
to serve as an expert witness on behalf of SSGT Ivan Frederick as SSGT Frederick was 
put to trial at a military court-martial. The ironic parallels between Abu Ghraib and the 
Stanford Prison Experiment influenced Zimbardo to create a model of situational forces 
that explain “how good people turn evil”; a model with psychological elements that are a 
perfect selection in helping to discover why some people engage in abuse while others at 
the other end of the spectrum, actively object to the abuse.        
In his book, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil, 
Zimbardo’s model contains six elements, or social dynamics as he calls them, which can 
lead to “good people turning evil,” several of which overlap with Milgram’s elements 
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because they are relatively broad. Zimbardo’s first element is power, which equates to the 
perception of authority and will not be part of future analysis. The second element is 
conformity, specifically individual discomfort with going against group norms. This 
element is more thoroughly covered by Milgram’s elements of sequential nature, 
situational obligations, and even anxiety. Conformity will not be mentioned as a separate 
element. Third is obedience, which again, is more thoroughly covered by Milgram’s 
entire model and is excluded from further analysis. Zimbardo even discusses Milgram’s 
shock experiment and outlines Milgram’s elements in this section.     
Zimbardo’s fourth element is deindividuation, or anonymity. Deindividuation is 
an aspect not tested or mentioned in Milgram’s shock experiment. Zimbardo discusses 
several experiments in which anonymity strongly correlates with a reduction of personal 
accountability.133  One compelling experiment that Zimbardo ran mirrored Milgram’s 
shock experiment, but introduced the concept of anonymity. Zimbardo had a group of 
women who would shock another group of women to study “creativity under stress.”  
Half of the women that were administrating shocks were dressed in lab coats with hoods 
and given numbers. The other half wore name tags without concealing clothing. As 
predicted, the group of anonymous women shocked the “subject” women much more 
often and for longer periods of time.134  In Zimbardo’s famous Stanford Prison 
Experiment, the prison guards frequently wore reflective sunglasses that partially masked 
their identities.135  Zimbardo discusses, among other examples, the affect of anonymity 
on warriors and soldiers. Physical appearance that contributes to anonymity, such as 
uniforms, painted faces, etc., correlates to more violent and abusive behavior.136   
The next element in Zimbardo’s list of social dynamics is dehumanization. 
Ultimately, dehumanization serves to vindicate what would normally be considered 
immoral behavior. It allows individuals the tool to act inhumanely while keeping their 
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self image as one of a moral agent. Sometimes dehumanization forms in the way of 
blaming victims for “getting what they deserve,” sometimes it is simply labeling them as 
beings less that human and not deserving of humane treatment, and sometimes it may 
come in another form. Eitherway, dehumanization is a critical tool in paving way for 
abuse. Dehumanization contributed to the SPE spiraling out of control so quickly. Right 
from the beginning of the experiment, the prisoners were blindfolded when they were 
arrested and upon arrival at the “prison,” the prisoners were strip searched and “then 
deloused with a spray, to convey our belief that he may have germs or lice.”137   
The last of Zimbardo’s elements is inaction. Zimbardo explains the tendency 
toward bystander inaction when certain circumstances exist, such as the diffusion of 
responsibility among large groups and the reduced sense of Good Samaritan 
responsibilities when an individual is in a time crunch.138  Additionally, Zimbardo 
discusses the enabling power of inaction in his own Stanford Prison Experiment when the 
“good guards,” even though they did not participate in abusive behavior, never intervened 
to stop the abuse. Furthermore, Zimbardo himself realized his own inaction as he was 
infatuated with the experiment until an outsider reigned him in, causing him to realize 
how out of control his experiment became.139   
B. TERRORIST ENGAGEMENT 
In an effort to counter the seemingly growing threat of terrorism after 9/11 there 
was a large push to identify a terrorist profile. Researchers quickly discovered that 
terrorists were typically psychologically sound individuals and that there was no one 
particular personality profile that fit even a majority of terrorists. Furthermore, it is just as 
difficult to form an all inclusive model for terrorist engagement. As the National 
Research Council stated regarding terrorist engagement: “It is evident that joining a 
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terrorist group is not related uniquely to any given motivational profile.”140  Even so, 
researchers still attempt to identify factors that might assist in identifying individuals 
conducive to joining terrorist organizations.  
1. John Horgan’s Model of Predisposing Factors for Terrorist 
Engagement 
John Horgan, who is noted later in this chapter for his model regarding terrorist 
disengagement, also formed a model with elements that, if predisposed to, could possibly 
indicate a desire to join a terrorist network. Horgan’s 6-element model is purely based on 
limited individual accounts, which Horgan admits is inadequate in relation to systematic 
empirical research.141  Horgan’s model has “little to do with inferring personality traits 
and more to do with attempts at identifying similarities across processes that may indicate 
a sense of development via engagement in a terrorist group.”142  Although Horgan’s 
model only includes 6 elements, he discusses that a catalyst event is often responsible for 
the final decision to engage in terrorism.143  This “catalysts event” is considered a 
separate element outside of Horgan’s model and is discussed later in this section. The 6 
elements of Horgan’s model of predisposing factors are previous relevant engagement, 
early experiences, nature of the community context, extent of adult socialization, 
dissatisfaction or disillusionment with individual’s current persona or activity, and range 
of competing alternatives and opportunities.  
Horgan’s first element, previous relevant engagement, relates to behavior and/or 
knowledge already relating to the conflict situation. Horgan gives an example of someone 
that previously threw stones at security forces, participated in protests, or in some other 
ways was involved in the conflict, even if minimally.144   
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The second element is early experiences, which Horgan relates specifically to 
victimization, such as victimization by security forces or a particular group.145   
Horgan’s third element is community context. In Horgan’s research, he found that 
the community’s elevated status of militants was an influential factor in participating in 
terrorist organizations,146 especially among ethno-nationalistic terrorist groups, such as 
the IRA. 
The fourth element in Horgan’s model is adult socialization. Horgan’s “adult 
socialization” element is the equivalent to Kim Cragin’s “family” element discussed later 
in this chapter. Horgan provides evidence that sometimes being single with no family 
responsibilities is a more attractive feature for recruiting suicide bombers, yet in other 
cases, having a family to care for also meant having well-needed support.147   
The fifth element of Horgan’s model is dissatisfaction with one’s current persona 
or activity. Horgan describes dissatisfaction as an avenue that makes an individual more 
“open to influence.”148  For example, if peaceful protesting does not change anything, 
then one might consider a more active way to protest. Horgan attributes this as not only a 
possible cause for people to join terrorist organizations, but for terrorists to move up to 
higher positions within the organization if the individual is not satisfied that enough 
action is taken.149   
The last element of Horgan’s model is competing alternatives and opportunities, 
which Horgan simply describes as consequences, such as losing a job, fear of 
recrimination from security forces, etc.150  Although fear is discussed as a separate 
element later in this chapter, Horgan’s element extends to a simple question of whether 
joining a terrorist organization is worth it.   
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2. John Horgan’s Catalyst Event for Involvement 
As mentioned earlier, Horgan discusses an additional factor that appears present 
in many individual accounts of engaging in terrorism. This element is a catalyst event and 
is not included in his model, but is included in the preliminary model created at the end of 
this chapter. A catalyst event, notes Horgan, often serves as an influential, deciding factor 
for someone to join a terrorist organization.151  Horgan admits that there exists a 
possibility that individuals overemphasize the personal significance of particular events 
to push responsibility to outside factors.152   
C. TERRORIST DERADICALIZATION, DISENGAGEMENT, AND NON-
RADICALIZATION 
Less common than radicalization and engagement in terrorism is deradicalization, 
disengagement, and non-radicalization. The idea that research in these three areas further 
enhances our understanding of terrorism beyond who becomes a terrorist and why is 
conceptually parallel to the intent of answering the research questions of this thesis. 
Exploring why former terrorists’ beliefs and behavior changes, and why people never 
become terrorists in the first place likely gives us an interesting insight into why U.S. 
service members opted not to participate in abuse at My Lai and Abu Ghraib, and why 
some actively objected.     
1. John Horgan’s Model for Psychological Disengagement from 
Terrorism 
Before John Horgan presents his model of psychological disengagement in his 
book Leaving Terrorism Behind, he ensures the reader is clear that in terrorism, extremist 
beliefs do not always equate to extremist behavior and vice versa.153  With that said, 
Horgan’s model specifically looks at the psychological reasons for leaving a terrorist 
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organization and its associated behavior behind. This model includes 5 factors: 
disillusionment arising from incongruence between the initial group ideals and fantasies 
that influenced an individual to join, and reality; disillusionment from disagreement over 
tactical issues; disillusionment from strategic, political, or ideological differences; 
becoming burned out; and changing personal priorities.  
Horgan’s first element, disillusionment from incongruence between 
ideals/fantasies that influenced an individual to join and reality, which is referred to as 
“disillusionment: perception vs. reality” for simplicity, is founded in the idea that many 
terrorist organizations rely on myths and ideology to promote recruitment and maintain 
credibility.154  For many, the realistic and sometimes hidden agenda proves disappointing 
if it does not fall into place with the perception of the organization that influenced the 
individual to join in the first place. Although this element is very similar to Milgram’s 
“overarching ideology” element, enough differences exist where the two elements cannot 
be combined. Specifically, there may be a difference in overarching ideology among the 
whistleblowers and abusers of the case studies, but Horgan’s element takes this a step 
further and compares the discrepancies between ideology and reality among various 
individuals.  
The second element in Horgan’s model is disillusionment from disagreement over 
tactics. Horgan uses an example of the terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah, operating 
in South East Asia and Mohammed Nasir Bin Abbas, the leader of military training of the 
organization.155  Although Abbas agreed with the ideology and strategic objectives of 
Jemaa Islamiyah, Abbas strongly disagreed with the tactic of intentionally targeting 
civilian non-combatants, which influenced him to leave the organization and later testify 
in court against another member of the terrorist organization.156   
      The third element of Horgan’s model is extremely close to his first. The third 
element is disillusionment from strategic, political, or ideological differences. This 
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element does not necessarily mean that an individual joined an organization with a 
perception of it that was different from reality, like his first element does. This third 
element relates to situations where organizations evolve and change, such as the IRA, 
which one member noted started as a sectarian war, but turned into a war against Britain, 
in which killing a British pregnant woman would be considered a victory.157   
Horgan’s fourth element is burn-out. Horgan defines this as 
“abandonment…linked to the stress of a commitment which is too demanding in terms of 
time or emotional investment.”158  This element is supported by accounts of terrorists, 
such as one former member of the Red Brigades who claimed that after devoting long 
hours to the organization, it was a relief to be imprisoned and be able to finally rest.159  
Factors such as long working hours and fatigue that contribute to Horgan’s burn-out 
element are the same contributors to Milgram’s anxiety/fear element.   
The fifth and final element of Horgan’s model is changing personal priorities. 
Some terrorists come to a realization that their conflict will likely end and when it ends, 
they will in many cases have to start a new life.   
2. Kim Cragin’s Conceptual Model for Non-radicalization 
As little research exists on leaving terrorist organizations, even less exists on why 
not everyone becomes a terrorist. Cragin provides a 4-element model that offers factors 
that deter individuals from joining terrorist organizations, noting that the opposite of 
these factors does not necessarily equate to factors that influence an individual to engage 
in terrorism. Cragin’s model of non-radicalization closely parallels the quest of this thesis 
to find out why some U.S. service members participate in abuse while some actively 
object at the opposite end of the spectrum. The 4 elements of Cragin’s model for non-
radicalization include family, logistical costs, financing, and fear.  
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The first element of this model is family obligation. Cragin’s element of family 
refers not to the obedience to authority taught to us by our family in early childhood, like 
Milgram’s element, but rather to the responsibility of a family. In her studies, Cragin 
found that although it was not always a stand-alone deterring factor, family responsibility 
was a considerable reason why some individuals decided not to get involved with 
terrorist organizations.160  Cragin’s element is evidenced by an Al Qaeda recruiting 
handbook, which recognizes that family obligations may discourage individuals from 
joining and therefore encourages recruiters not to push recruits away from their families 
in the early stages of the recruits’ involvement.161   
Cragin’s second element is logistics, which she simply explains that “logistical 
costs pose somewhat of a barrier to potential recruits, especially if they are required to 
travel beyond their immediate residence.”162   
The third element of Cragin’s model is financing, which stems from the simple 
fact that terrorist organizations need financing to function, financing that often comes 
from its own members.163    
Fear is the fourth element of Cragin’s model for non-radicalization. Cragin relates 
fear specifically to a fear of security forces.   
D. GANG INVOLVEMENT 
Increasing gang violence, like terrorism, resulted in a need to look at possible 
ways to prevent gang activity in the first place; specifically prevention of initial gang 
involvement. To reduce recruitment, law enforcement officials must look at who joins 
gangs and why. This following section reviews several models for gang involvement; 
however, this body of literature in it of itself may not answer the research questions of 
this thesis. Considering this thesis is regarding U.S. service members only, the research in 
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this section is limited to general gang information or Central Americans and American 
gangs. Additionally, one might reasonably argue that joining a gang is not a direct 
correlation to abuse and violence, however, research supports that “gang-involved youth 
are more likely to engage in extreme acts of violence than their delinquent peers who are 
not gang involved.”164   
1. Martin Sanchez Jankowski’s Model of Reasons to Join a Gang 
Martin Sanchez Janowski’s book, Islands in the Street: Gangs and American 
Urban Society, includes his model on reasons why individuals join already existing 
gangs. His model is comprised of 6 elements: material incentives, recreation, a place of 
refuge and camouflage, physical protection, a time to resist, and commitment to 
community.  
Janowski’s first element, material incentives, specifically relates to money. His 
studies found that the most given reason for joining a gang was the notion that gang 
membership would provide a relatively steady stream of income.165  Additionally, 
individuals believed the notion that the more members involved in a gang, the more 
people to help secure money. If a member or a member’s family ended up in financial 
need, the other members of a gang could assist.166  Lastly, many individuals in gangs saw 
their membership as a way to connect to other individuals that could financially help 
them out if they struggled in the future.167   
The second element in Janowski’s model is recreation. Janowski interestingly 
compares the entertainment of gang involvement with that of a fraternity of college 
students.168  Gangs are a social organization and if socializing through a gang is the best 
form of entertainment in a neighborhood or town, then one can expect people to join. 
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Janowski’s element of recreation as a reason for gang involvement includes not only 
entertainment such as games, but also access to drugs, alcohol, and women.169  Craig 
Palmer and Christopher Tilley’s research supported Janowski’s findings, especially 
regarding sexual access to females as a motivation for joining gangs. Their research 
found that this motivator was even used as a recruiting tool.170   
Janowski’s third element is “a place of refuge and camouflage,” which is simply 
anonymity. Janowski states “They see the gang as offering them anonymity, which may 
relieve the stresses associated with having to be personally accountable for all their 
actions in an intensely competitive environment.”171  To spare the reader redundancy, “a 
place of refuge and camouflage” is considered the same as the “deindividuation” element 
discussed earlier in the psychology section of this chapter.   
The fourth element in Janowski’s model is physical protection. He states that 
individuals desiring physical protection are not necessarily the weakest members of the 
gang, but would prefer not to be on alert as much or would like to secure more time to 
make more money.172  One could reasonably argue that this element is synonymous with 
our preliminary model’s anxiety/fear element; however, as Janowski explains in his 
model, the desire for physical protection does not always derive from fear.   
“A time to resist” is Janowski’s fifth element. Janowski’s research showed that 
many gang members wanted to avoid the life that their parents live,173 which is often 
associated with a life of poverty.174  Joining a gang can serve as a statement to society or 
a simple delay in getting a job.175   
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Janowski’s final element is commitment to community. Contrary to the element 
of resistance, or joining a gang to live a different life than one’s parents, a commitment to 
community, specifically family tradition of gang membership, is a motivating factor for 
some individuals to join. Some gangs exist for generations where it is a family tradition 
to earn membership.176   
2. Predictors of Gang Involvement from Mobile Youth Survey Data 
In 2013, a 14 year study concluded, revealing supporting evidence of predictors of 
gang involvement. Although this study is extremely small scale considering it only 
relates to data from Mobile, Alabama, its compelling results are likely applicable to many 
gangs in general and possible to the My Lai and Abu Ghraib case studies as well. This 
model, which is referred to as “Mobile Gang Involvement” for simplicity, contains three 
elements: peer influence, family cohesion, and self-worth.  
The first element, peer influence, is simply supported with correlating evidence 
that an individual is more likely to join a gang when others in the community are already 
involved in gangs.177  Additionally, “delinquent peer relationships are among the 
strongest predictors of delinquent activity.”178  Peer influence differs only slightly from 
the anxiety Stanley Milgram discusses in his model, specifically when an individual has 
an internal desire to fit in to his/her hierarchical role. Still, behavior driven from peer 
pressure is not completely the same as behavior driven from obedience.   
The second element in this model is family cohesion. The Mobile Gang 
Involvement model provides evidence that the more cohesive a family unit is and the 
more involved parents are in their children’s lives, the less likely children are to join a 
gang.179  This concept has existed for decades. A study was conducted in the 1950s that 
revealed “That the harm done when the young boy lacks a father to love can  be 
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overcome if he forms an affectionate attachment to an older male by the time is he 14 
years old.”180   
The third and final element in the Mobile Gang Involvement model is self-worth. 
The study notes the correlation that self-esteem is a critical factor of psychological 
stability181  and low self-esteem is correlated to behavior such as aggression and 
delinquency, therefore increasing the chance for gang involvement.182  Furthermore, Hal 
Marcovitz in his book, Gangs, attributes poor performance in school, and thus lower self 
worth to higher gang involvement.183   
3. The Additional Element of Age 
Although it is not an element of the models above that explain gang involvement, 
young age is a widely known demographic of gangs, considering nearly half of gang 
members are under the age of 18, according to the National Gang Center.184  
Additionally, age relates to several other factors. For example, one study correlates the 
young age of new gang members with the emerging desire, and therefore competition, for 
sexual access to females.185   
E. OFFICIAL REPORTS ON CASE STUDIES 
After substantial amounts of negative publicity after My Lai and Abu Ghraib 
came to light, multiple investigations were launched into the horrible abuse that severely 
deteriorated the reputation of the U.S. Armed Forces. The intent of these investigations, 
of course, was to answer the questions of “what went wrong and why did this happen?”  
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Considering that the research questions ask not “why did this happen” but rather “why 
did only some individuals participate in the abuse while others actively objected,” it is 
paramount to look at what these investigative reports have to say about the very case 
studies under examination in this thesis, as multiple investigations include their own 
models specific to explaining abuse at My Lai and Abu Ghraib.  
1. Peers Inquiry Model on the My Lai Massacre 
In November 1969, Lieutenant General William Peers was selected by the Army 
Chief of Staff to run an inquiry into the March 1968 My Lai massacre. The Peers inquiry 
provided a detailed report of the massacre as well as a model for explaining how My Lai 
happened. Peers’ model originally contained 13 elements, but eventually downsized it to 
9 elements.186  The 9 elements in Peers’ model are: lack of proper training, attitude 
toward the Vietnamese, permissive attitude, psychological factors, organizational 
problems, nature of the enemy, plans and orders, attitude of government officials and 
leaders, and leadership.   
Lack of training is the first element in the model formed by Peers. The Peers 
Inquiry reported that training on topics such as rules of engagement, protecting 
noncombatants, law of war, etc., severely lacked and contributed to the events of the My 
Lai massacre.187  Some individuals reported that they received training, but did not 
remember it, and others claimed no training at all.188  This issue surfaced again when 
investigations began at Abu Ghraib.   
The next element is attitude toward the Vietnamese. Peers noted that derogatory 
terms such as “gooks,” “dinks,” and “slopes,” etc., were regularly used terms by 
Americans to describe the Vietnamese, both combatants and non-combatants alike.189   
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The third element is permissive attitude. After concluding the investigation, Peers 
noted evidence that abuse of non-combatants including rape, unnecessary killings, etc., 
had occurred long before the My Lai incident.190  This long term abuse that both 
continued and escalated is equivalent to Milgram’s element of sequential nature 
discussed earlier in the chapter.  
The fourth element of the Peers Inquiry model is leadership. Peers found 
leadership one of the leading factors attributed to My Lai. Various violations were 
discovered during the Peers Inquiry, including:  
Failure to follow established division policy and lack of enforcement of 
that policy, failure to control the situation on the ground along with a lack 
of personal checking to determine the true nature of the operation, failure 
to issue appropriate and positive instructions for an investigation, lack of 
follow up on leads indicating that a massacre had occurred, and many 
others.191 
Psychological factors are the fifth element of the Peers Inquiry model. Peers 
describes the psychological factors in several ways, all of which are previously covered 
in this chapter, therefore this element is not included as a separate element in the 
preliminary model. One of the psychological factors that Peers describes is fear and 
anxiety. Charlie Company was subject to multiple casualties due to mines, booby traps, 
etc., which left the soldiers on edge and fearful for their lives.192  Additionally, added 
stress formed along with the pressure to seek revenge for the recent death of SSgt Cox.193  
Another psychological factor was the pressure to engage in combat and kill Vietnamese. 
Moral was affected from the competitive attitude between company commanders to 
“achieve the highest body count.”194   
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The sixth element is organizational problems. Peers found Task Force Barker, 
along with most U.S. units deployed to Vietnam to be severely undermanned resulting in 
frequent rotations, over tasking, and ad hoc organizations.195   
The seventh element is nature of the enemy. The Vietcong had a large advantage 
of knowing the local land and population. They were an extremely illusive enemy with a 
complex system of caves and tunnels in which they would disappear into hiding.196  The 
local women and children would often give them fair warning when sightings of U.S., 
South Vietnamese, or South Korean forces occurred.197  Furthermore, the Vietcong, after 
retreating, would quickly change out of their combat attire and blend in with the local 
villagers, making it even more difficult to distinguish between combatants and 
noncombatants.198   
Plans and orders is the eighth element of the Peers Inquiry model. After various 
testimonies from multiple witnesses, Peers concluded that the plans and orders given to 
Charlie Company by the chain of command all the way up to Lieutenant Colonel Barker, 
leader of the ad hoc Task Force Barker, were vague and unclear. Instruction on how to 
interact with civilians was gravely lacking and the terminology used, such as “search and 
destroy” and “revenge” left many soldiers to assume all Vietnamese villagers that they 
came across, including the villagers’ livestock and crops, were “fair game” to destroy.199   
The final element of the Peers inquiry model is government officials’ attitude of 
the Vietnamese. Peers acknowledge that the derogatory, dehumanizing perception of the 
Vietnamese was not just present among the lower ranks. Peers found that local 
Vietnamese authorities considered all of its inhabitants to have loyalties to the Vietcong 
if they were not actually Vietcong soldiers.200  This attitude was shared among American 
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officials as well, and little preventative action was taken to minimize noncombatant 
casualties.201   
2. Schlesinger Report’s Model of Abusive Treatment at Abu Ghraib 
In the case of Abu Ghraib, multiple investigations and multiple official reports 
were released looking into the infamous abuses. Although the consensus is that a large 
variety of factors contributed to abuse at Abu Ghraib including the presidential 
administration’s vague and loose policy on torture, the Schlesinger Report contains a 
separate section on psychological stresses and offers a model explaining specifically why 
abuse occurred. The 5-element model of abusive treatment at Abu Ghraib is 
unsurprisingly similar to Zimbardo’s model considering the Schlesinger Report notes the 
Stanford Prison Experiment and the uncanny similarities to the abuse that occurred at 
Abu Ghraib. The 5 elements of the Schlesinger Report model are: deindividuation, 
groupthink, dehumanization, enemy image, and moral exclusion. Although the model 
does not provide a detailed link to specific incidents at Abu Ghraib, it provides generic 
definitions of its elements which are considered for inclusion in the preliminary model 
formed at the end of this chapter.  
The Schlesinger Report model’s first element is deindividuation, which the report 
defines where the “anonymity, suggestibility, and contagion provided in a crowd allows 
individuals to participate in behavior marked by the temporary suspension of customary 
rules and inhibitions.”202  Additionally, the report attributes reduced self-awareness to 
abusive behavior.203  Without subjecting the reader to redundancy, deindividuation is not 
explained further, as it is already a part of Zimbardo’s model. 
The next element is groupthink. A group setting often provides a false sense of 
invulnerability and unanimity, and is usually conducive to peer pressure.204  Although 
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similar to some of the other elements previously discussed, group think brings up a 
dynamic yet to be discussed: the powerful influence of a group.   
The third element is dehumanization; when individuals or groups are considered 
inferior and less than human, resulting in their exclusion of the humanity that would 
normally be extended to other human beings.205  Like deindividuation, this element is 
already considered in Zimbardo’s model. 
Enemy image is the fourth element. The Schlesinger Report describes enemy 
image as the phenomenon when both belligerents of a conflict consider themselves good 
and moral, while the other is evil and wrong.206   
The final element of the Schlesinger Report’s model for abusive treatment is 
moral exclusion. Moral exclusion occurs when one group views another as disparate from 
themselves and therefore moral rules do not apply to the other group.207   
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IV. A PRELIMINARY MODEL TO EXPLAIN PARTICIPATION 
IN ABUSE 
With the background of each case study explained in adequate depth, and an 
understanding of multiple models that explain the psychology of obedience, terrorist 
engagement, terrorist disengagement and non-radicalization, and gang involvement, it is 
now time to discuss the preliminary model and test it against the Abu Ghraib and My Lai 
case study.    This preliminary model is built from specific factors, or elements, derived 
from the various models explained in chapter 3. Elements that were deemed appropriate 
and suitable to include in the preliminary model are given brief explanation of their 
importance prior to testing against the case studies. Unfortunately, explaining in detail 
why elements from preexisting models were excluded from the preliminary model is 
beyond the scope of this thesis;208 however, perhaps it would prove useful for further 
research to test all elements, not just the elements in the preliminary model of this thesis, 
which were chosen based on the author’s discretion. The structure of this chapter will 
include a table of the preliminary model showing which original models each element 
was derived from, followed a brief re-explanation of the element and finally, a test of 
each element against each case study, leaving the reader with a refined model, discussed 
in Chapter V, which indeed explains, even if partially, why some U.S. service members 
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Table 1. The 7-Element Preliminary Model. 
ELEMENT ORIGINATING AUTHOR/MODEL 
Sequential nature 1. Stanley Milgram’s Obedience Paradigm 2. Peers Inquiry 
Anxiety/Fear 
1. Stanley Milgram’s Obedience Paradigm 
2. Cragin’s Model of Non-radicalization 
3. Peers Inquiry 
Deindividuation 
1. Philip Zimbardo’s Social Dynamics 
2. Janowski’s Model 
3. Schlesinger Report 
Family obligation 1. Cragin’s Model of Non-radicalization 2. Horgan’s Model of Terrorist Engagement 
Recreation 1. Janowski’s Model  
Age 1. Various models from literature on gangs 
Group think/peer influence 1. Schlesinger Report 2. Janowski’s Model 
 
A. SEQUENTIAL NATURE 
As discussed earlier, Milgram and Peers refer to sequential nature, which occur in 
both quality and quantity. The idea behind this concept is that abuse or obedience, for 
that matter does not typically occur at maximum levels without a build up over time. In 
other words, “isolated” incidents such as My Lai and Abu Ghraib do not just happen; 
they are a systemic result of a sequence of conditions which allowed abuse to get to the 
point that it did.          
1. Testing Sequential Nature against the My Lai Case Study 
After concluding the investigation, Peers noted evidence that abuse of non-
combatants including rape, torture, unnecessary killings, etc., had occurred long before 
the My Lai incident.209  Prior to My Lai, Major General Samuel Koster, commander of 
the Americal Division in which Task Force Barker and Charlie Company were a part of, 
issued a memorandum to the officers, “Acts of Discourtesy Toward Vietnamese People,” 
which discouraged abuse, inhumane treatment, and derogatory behavior toward the 
                                                 
209 Peers, The My Lai Inquiry, 232. 
 57 
Vietnamese people.210  Despite this instruction, U.S. ground troops continued to act in 
accordance with current practice and as new units rotated in, they did the same.211 
What started as physical violence, such as injuring prisoners with rifle butts and 
cutting off hair and beards, an extreme act of disrespect in the Vietnamese culture, 
escalated to torturing and killing prisoners, and raping the women of the village.212  
Within Charlie Company in particular, group raping was a “normal tactic” that many of 
the men regularly participated in well before the My Lai massacre; one group of men 
would search a village questioning people and searching hooches while another group 
would all participate in the raping of one or more of the village women, and then the 
groups would switch.213  Another abusive custom that developed well before My Lai was 
collecting body parts as trophies; U.S. soldiers would hack off the ears of the “enemy” 
and display them like trophies, for example, stringing them on radio antennas.214      
The repeated and escalating abuse caused desensitization even among individuals 
who initially were disturbed by the behavior of their fellow soldiers. One soldier in My 
Lai describes this desensitization perfectly: 
I remember seeing people butted in the head with rifles. But you start 
losing your sense of what’s normal. You don’t give up your morals, but 
you become a lot more tolerant. We believed this behavior was pretty 
commonplace. I didn’t think we were doing anything different from any 
other unit. You really do lose your sense…not of right or wrong, but your 
degree of wrong changes.215   
 
 Regarding the whistleblowers of My Lai, CWO Thompson and Ron Ridenhour, it 
is imperative to look at whether they, too, were subject to the same long term, escalating 
abusive environment. As mentioned later in this chapter, the type of aircraft that CWO 
Thompson and Ron Ridenhour flew on required a return to a landing zone for refueling 
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approximately every two hours.216  The relatively short duration of reconnaissance 
missions due to logistical limitations served as an interruption in the sequential nature of 
abuse that CWO Thompson and Ron Ridenhour might have experienced. Essentially, 
CWO Thompson and Ron Ridenhour were not witness to or a part of the repeated and 
escalating scale of violence as were the ground troops of Charlie Company; instead, they 
were exposed to the abuse at a very late stage when their morals were still in check with 
the majority of Americans. This late exposure left them shocked and disapproving, just as 
it would if any other American were instantaneously step into My Lai. It is impossible to 
determine that CWO Thompson or Ridenhour would or would not have reported abuse 
earlier if they learned about it earlier; however, the overall lack of gradual exposure 
caused them to escape the desensitization that most of Charlie Company experienced on 
the ground.    
2. Testing Sequential Nature against the Abu Ghraib Case Study 
Prison abuse in U.S. run-prisons in the Middle East occurred long before the Abu 
Ghraib prison scandal came to light,217 the most infamous example being the death of 
two wrongly-accused detainees at the hands of U.S. personnel in the Bagram prison in 
Afghanistan in 2002.218  Just as abuse happened often and escalated overtime 
systemically, the same pattern occurred on the individual level as well. One soldier with 
an MP unit at Abu Ghraib, Aiden Delgado, wrote a memoir The Sutras of Abu Ghraib, 
describing the abusive behavior that occurred often, and slowly escalated over time:  
The games we soldiers play are innocuous at first: drawing murals, playing stickball, 
building desks and chairs and collecting pinup girls from Maxim. They grow in intensity 
and stake. One moment we’re in our room catching flies and the next we’re crowded 
around a cinder block watching two camel spiders hiss and goad each other to the 
inevitable bloody finish. Hunting rats becomes hunting dogs. Driving outside Tallil, 
someone throws a piece of garbage at an Iraqi from his Humvee window and they make a 
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game of it down the road…it escalates. Time skips forward, and suddenly we’re at Abu 
Ghraib and there are no more spiders to play with, so people invent new games…219  
Another soldier at Abu Ghraib recalls the escalation of abuse: “you forget what you saw 
that day because the next day you see something worse”220  To support these accounts, 
one can see the long list of “incidents” documented in the Fay-Jones Report.221  This list 
only covers incidents from September 15, 2003 to January 08, 2004; however, there are 
likely many other incidents of abuse that are out of this time range or undocumented. For 
example, SGT Darby notes that abuse of detainees was not a new thing; the very first day 
the 372nd MP Company arrived at Abu Ghraib, the soldiers witnessed the current unit 
enforcing detainees to wear women’s underwear.222 
An additional aspect worth mentioning, although somewhat debated, is CPL 
Graner’s history of abuse in his civilian capacity, ranging from domestic abuse to his 
wife, to allegations of abusing prisoners as a prison guard in the state prison he worked 
at.223  Although CPL Graner was exculpated from charges of prisoner abuse as a civilian 
correctional officer, if the allegations were true, then his violent history is noteworthy. 
Abusing Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib would naturally be the next sequential step after 
abusing American prisoners in a state prison.   
 Now it is time to look at the whistleblowers and if they were subject to the same 
“slippery slope” affect of abuse. First of all, had SGT Darby broken protocol and 
socialized with the MP’s in Tier 1A like SPC England did, he, too, may have become 
desensitized to the buildup of abuse which regularly happened, although one cannot 
assume this. Regardless, SGT Darby became aware of the abuse at its peak when CPL 
Graner turned over a CD of incriminating photographs. SGT Darby was in disbelief over 
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the levels of abuse; he knew it was clearly wrong and that the abusers would go to jail.224  
Just like CWO Thompson and Ron Ridenhour at My Lai, he was exposed to the later 
stages of abuse and because his sense of morals was not desensitized, he was able to 
report the abuse. With this said, one might question why SPC Wisdom reported the abuse 
initially to his team leader when he, like most of the abusers, was an MP. A lack of 
evidence exists to show whether or not SPC Wisdom witnessed other abuse in the prison; 
however, one very interesting fact, is that SPC Wisdom just returned from a two-week 
R&R, or “rest and recovery” period back in the United States.225  Even more interesting, 
is that SGT Darby had also returned from leave back in the United States prior to asking 
CPL Graner for pictures.226  This indicates that even if SPC Wisdom and SGT Darby had 
begun to become desensitized if they were exposed to early stages of abuse, their sense of 
wrong was possibly “normalized” once they were back home around people that likely 
share similar morals and beliefs. Contrarily, none of the abusers are on record to have 
recently taken leave stateside prior to the abuse.  
B. ANXIETY AND FEAR 
Anxiety and fear covers a broad spectrum of situations, ranging from the fear of 
one’s life that most likely all of the individuals in the case studies felt at one point or 
another, to the anxiety felt when an individual had internal conflict between following 
orders and personal morals. When testing this element against the case studies, several 
situations where anxiety and fear is different between abusers and whistleblowers were 
prevalent enough to consider for discussion, specifically fear of one’s physical safety, 
anxiety from leadership pressuring performance, anxiety from the social conflict of 
following orders versus acting immoral, and lastly, fear of repercussion felt by the 
whistleblowers.           
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1. Testing Anxiety and Fear against the My Lai Case Study 
It is not intended to underestimate the dangers and fears of reconnaissance pilots 
in the Vietnam War; however, there were differences in physical security between the 
abusers and whistleblowers that are noteworthy. First, CWO Thompson’s OH-23 
reconnaissance helicopter, although lightly armed, was always covered by two 
“gunships,”227 UH-1 Huey helicopters with much heavier firepower. Additionally, the 
OH-23 observation helicopter was equipped to stay on station for approximately 2 hours 
at a time before CWO Thompson would return to LZ Dottie to refuel.228  Contrary to the 
logistics of CWO Thompson’s mission as a reconnaissance pilot which required his 
return to the relatively protected and fortified safety of a landing zone, the men of Charlie 
Company were in the field for weeks on end,229 with no immediate physical protection 
other than the weapons they carried. Although Charlie Company did not encounter many 
casualties or much enemy resistance until a month before My Lai, the long days of 
patrolling and anxiously waiting to encounter the elusive enemy likely took a toll on the 
soldiers’ moral230 and certainly increased fatigue and stress. The reader should remember 
that Ron Ridenhour was a helicopter gunner in an observation helicopter, flying the same 
types of missions that CWO Thompson flew;231 therefore, the logistical differences 
between CWO Thompson and the ground troops of Charlie Company also are present 
when comparing whistleblower Ron Ridenhour to the ground troops of Charlie Company 
that committed the abuse.  
In February, 1968, casualties in Charlie Company ramped up.232  The casualties 
were caused by land mines and booby traps, but Charlie Company had yet to have any 
face-to-face combat with the Viet Cong.233  Not only was there competitive attitude 
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between company commanders to “achieve the highest body count,”234 a competition in 
which Charlie Company was failing at, but there also was an increasing pressure 
immediately before My Lai for Charlie Company to seek revenge for the recent death of 
SSG Cox, one of Charlie Company’s men who had died from a booby trap days 
before.235  This pressure dynamic was realistically not the same among CWO Thompson, 
Ron Ridenhour, and the other reconnaissance pilots and aircrew.  
Furthermore, the internal anxiety, introduced by Milgram, in which an individual 
feels when the orders from an authority figure conflict with personal morals, is present 
among the ground troops of Charlie Company, but not necessarily applicable to CWO 
Thompson or Ron Ridenhour. Unlike the men of Charlie Company who were in direct 
and physical contact with their immediate chain of command, CWO Thompson was 
obviously not in physical proximity of his commander or the leadership on the ground 
that he was supporting. This dynamic is understandable considering the nature of being in 
a helicopter providing ground support; however, what complicated matters further was 
poor communication means. CWO Thompson did not have communication with the 
ground commander he was supporting, the task force commander’s helicopter, or his high 
gunship; his only means of communication was through radio communication with his 
low gunship.236  This is not to assume that CWO Thompson would have participated in 
abuse, had he communications with an authority figure on the ground that was telling him 
to murder noncombatants, rather, CWO Thompson may have stopped the abuse earlier if 
he had available means to report the abuse over radio communications. Regardless, CWO 
Thompson was not standing on the ground, ordered to shoot non-combatants. As 
mentioned before, in one soldier’s case, 2LT Calley went as far to point his rifle at one of 
his own platoon members when he refused to kill a group of unarmed Vietnamese 
villagers. Again, one cannot assume that CWO Thompson would blindly kill 
noncombatants if he was on the ground and ordered to do so by his immediate chain of 
command; however, the disparate structure of authority between CWO Thompson and his 
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chain of command, and the Charlie Company soldiers and 2LT Calley, cannot be ignored. 
This same analysis would apply to Ron Ridenhour, had he been present at My Lai.                 
Lastly, there exists a possible fear among whistleblowers that is not present 
among abusers, and that is fear of repercussion from reporting abuse. CWO Thompson 
seems to lack fear of repercussion, or at least accept possible consequences, as he recalls 
returning to LZ Dottie extremely mad and reporting the abuse to his commander, adding 
“if this damn stuff is what’s happening here, you can take these wing right now ‘cause 
they’re only sewn on with thread.”237  CWO Thompson’s account indicates that the worst 
repercussion he would receive is losing his pilot’s wings. In the case of Ron Ridenhour, 
however, Ridenhour had flown over My Lai a few days after the massacre and witnessed 
the aftermath, but decided not to take action immediately because he feared for his 
life.238  Ridenhour was not the only one fearful of repercussion. Individuals of Charlie 
Company who disagreed with the operation at My Lai were not only threatened but 
blatantly placed in more dangerous positions. One Charlie Company soldier, Michael 
Bernhardt, who later discussed My Lai with Ridenhour, recalled that CAPT Medina 
forced him to stay out in the field and in the front of the line every time the company 
thought they were entering a high ambush area.239  Despite Bernhardt’s pleas to transfer 
and requests for medical attention because of jungle rot, he was denied.240  Ultimately, 
Bernhardt left, unauthorized, by jumping on a supply helicopter and getting a ride to a 
hospital where he finally received proper treatment severe jungle rot.241  Based on 
Bernhardt’s account, there were likely other individuals of Charlie Company that feared 
their lives if they did not participate in the massacre at My Lai, and certainly if they had 
actively objected to the horrible abuse.  
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2. Testing Anxiety and Fear against the Abu Ghraib Case Study 
Abu Ghraib was the most heavily targeted U.S. occupied compounds, subject to 
approximately 20 mortar attacks per week.242  Despite this violence that left Abu 
Ghraib’s occupants living in fear, there were additional facets of physical fear that the 
MP’s typically experienced on the job, in which whistleblower SGT Darby did not. First 
of all the prisoners took any and every opportunity to build makeshift weapons out of 
everyday material, such as broken glass, sharpened toothbrushes, etc.243  As if this was 
not threatening enough, the Iraqi guards frequently proved corrupt, smuggling weapons 
in and letters out for a small fee.244  Furthermore, the prisoners attempted frequent 
assaults on MP’s, which added to the fear and anxiety, especially with the ever-growing 
population of detainees.245  All of these fears for physical safety were simply not as risky 
for file clerk, SGT Darby. One can argue that SPC England was also a file clerk; 
however, her relationship with CPL Graner, discussed later in this chapter, influenced her 
to breach protocol and “hang out” with the MP’s in the prisoner tiers. Although the 
extremely poor living conditions extended to all parties at Abu Ghraib, including 
headquarters, the nature of the file clerk did not call for SGT Darby to quell riots or 
handle detainees, as was required by the MP’s. 
The next aspect of anxiety and fear is anxiety from leadership pressuring 
performance. The natural reaction of 9/11 was to demand “actionable intelligence” and 
Tier 1A in Abu Ghraib was an interrogation center, specifically formed by the Secretary 
of Defense.246  This overall ideology created pressure, specifically upon the MP’s to 
soften the prisoners enough so OGA’s could successfully interrogate them and receive 
useful intelligence. Although the MP’s never received direct orders to specifically abuse 
the prisoners, the environment became one where the MP’s ultimately served unidentified 
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individuals from OGA’s and even received performance feedback from them.247  SGT 
Darby was simply not under the same pressure demands to effectively get intelligence 
from detainees, although neither was SPC England.   
Anxiety resulting from a conflict between following orders and one’s morals does 
not initially appear to apply to the Abu Ghraib case because the abusers were not 
following specific orders, other than their own interpretation of what it meant to “soften” 
the detainees. However, one MP’s account of a conversation with CPL Graner indicated 
otherwise. CPL Graner reportedly told the other soldier “I’m havin’ to yell, and do other 
things to detainees that I feel are morally and ethically wrong…every time a bomb goes 
off outside the wire, or outside the fence, they come in, and they tell me, that’s another 
American losin’ their life. And unless you help us, their blood’s on your hands as 
well.”248 
The last factor to consider when analyzing the element of anxiety and fear is 
whistleblower fear of retribution. After receiving the CD documenting prisoner abuse, 
SGT Darby’s fear of retribution kept him from turning in the evidence right away. Once 
SGT Darby did turn in the CD’s to CID, he was so fearful of retribution if his friends 
found out, that he slept with a loaded pistol under his pillow.249  Unfortunately, for SGT 
Darby, his fear was justified: upon the release of his identity on national television, he 
and his family received death threats and could not return to his home when he was sent 
back stateside.250   
C. DEINDIVIDUATION 
As shown in the field of psychology as well as gang involvement, 
deindividuation, or anonymity, have a strong effect on one’s willingness to partake in 
violence. The unconscious strategies for achieving deindividuation are reducing social 
accountability and reducing self-evaluation. Going into slightly more detail than in 
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Chapter III, reducing social accountability happens when an individual feels anonymous, 
and reducing self-evaluation happens essentially when an individual uses an excuse to 
stop monitoring his or her own behavior.251  This second strategy occurs by drug or 
alcohol use, arousing strong emotions, engaging in hyperintense actions, giving up 
concern for the past or present, or pawning off responsibility.252  Although some form of 
deindividuation typically exists in incidents like My Lai and Abu Ghraib, levels of 
deindividuation must be different between abusers and whistleblowers if this element is 
to have a place in the final model which helps answer the research questions of this 
thesis.    
1. Testing Deindividuation against the My Lai Case Study 
One should begin by looking at the first strategy to achieve deindividuation, 
which is reducing social accountability through anonymity. In what ways, if any, did the 
abusers of My Lai resign social accountability through anonymity when the 
whistleblowers did not?  As Zimbardo notes, changing one’s external appearance to 
conduct war has a compelling effect on an individual’s willingness to partake in extreme 
violence.253  This indeed is true of the men of Charlie Company who wore the same 
uniform and were personally unknown to the My Lai villagers; however, it is also true of 
CWO Thompson and Ron Ridenhour, who were also wearing the same uniform and 
whose identity was unknown among the My Lai villagers. Reducing accountability 
through anonymity, therefore, is not a sufficient indicator in different levels of 
deindividuation.   
 Using Zimbardo’s second strategy for accomplishing deindividuation, reducing 
self-evaluation, one can start to see differences between abusers and whistleblowers in 
nearly all aspects. First, although not substantial enough to attribute it a significant role in 
My Lai, Peers did find evidence of drugs and alcohol among the men of Charlie 
Company; specifically evident of drinking late the night before the operation, and 
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smoking Marijuana.254  The abusers of Charlie Company also had charged emotions that 
internally excused them of their actions; emotions that CWO Thompson and Ron 
Ridenhour did not seem to possess: revenge. As mentioned under the element of anxiety 
and fear, the previous day’s briefing by CAPT Medina was filled with vague, but 
suggestive orders to seek revenge for the recent casualties suffered within Charlie 
Company.255  As far as engaging in hyperintense activities, it goes without doubt that the 
soldiers of Charlie Company engaged in the most extreme forms of violent, such as rape 
and torture. This extreme behavior was both a product of deindividuation, as well as 
contributor to deindividuation, considering the violent abuse went by largely 
unpunished.256  CWO Thompson contrarily was precise in his mission when identifying 
targets. CWO Thompson had clear guidelines that a weapon should be positively 
identified before a suspect was shot, even if the individual was suspiciously running 
away.257  A disregard for the past or present also became relevant among the abusers of 
My Lai. As mentioned before, the casualties suffered by Charlie Company consisted of 
booby traps and mines:258 enemies which could not be seen or killed. This frustration of 
an elusive enemy, a constantly looming threat of death, and the perception of a never-
ending war contributed to a lack of concern for the future. One could say the pessimistic 
view of when the war would end, or not end, was also applicable to CWO Thompson and 
Ron Ridenhour. This may hold true; however, CWO Thompson and Ridenhour, as 
discussed under the anxiety and fear element, were not subject to the same stresses that 
the soldiers of Charlie Company experienced. Lastly, the diffusion of responsibility 
aspect that Zimbardo discusses certainly occurred within Charlie Company, but not 
necessarily with CWO Thompson or Ridenhour. The abusers of Charlie Company had 
the backing of their platoon commanders, and in the case of first platoon, were even 
ordered at gunpoint to shoot unarmed civilians. If this was not enough reason to follow 
orders, one should again refer to CAPT Medina’s brief the day before. Perhaps some 
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individuals in Charlie Company still felt culpable for their actions; however, personal 
responsibility lacked enough to result in the death of over 500 unarmed civilians.               
2. Testing Deindividuation against the Abu Ghraib Case Study 
To test the element of deindividuation against Abu Ghraib, the same structure will 
be used as the previous section; specifically comparing Zimbardo’s “strategies” for 
deindividuation, which are reducing social accountability and reducing self-evaluation. 
As a reminder, social accountability is reduced when anonymity is increased. Multiple 
conditions which reduced anonymity were found to exist in Tier 1A, which were not 
necessarily present in other locations, specifically in headquarters, where SGT Darby 
worked. First, it became acceptable for the MP’s, at least in Tier 1A, to stop wearing their 
full uniforms.259  This was in part due to lax standards, but also protocol within Tier1A: 
“It is recommended that all military personnel in the segregation area reduce knowledge 
of their true identities to these specialized detainees. The use of sterilized uniforms 
[cleansed of all identification] is highly suggested and personnel should NOT address 
each other by true name and rank in the segregation area.”260  This same protocol applied 
to individuals from OGA’s, who, with no questions asked, came in without military 
uniforms or any sort of identification, conducted interrogations, and left.261  The only 
interface between these mysterious individuals and Abu Ghraib seemed to be the 
“softening” of detainees by the MP’s prior to interrogations. These indicators of 
anonymity that reduced social accountability were unique to Tier 1A and its U.S. 
incumbents, even if some individuals were not authorized to be there, such as SPC 
England.  
There also exist differences in deindividuation, specifically self-evaluation, 
between the whistleblowers and the abusers of Abu Ghraib. Although no drug or alcohol 
use was suspected in the abuse at Abu Ghraib, other aspects of reducing self-evaluation 
were evident; the first being the arousal of strong emotions. Without repeating pieces 
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from the anxiety and fear element, there were other strong emotions that happened in 
Tier1A and not elsewhere, specifically in correlation to the abuse which occurred the 
evening of November 7th, resulting in the majority of the infamous photographs 
associated with the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. The riot that occurred earlier in the day, 
discussed in Chapter II, riled up a mix of emotions among the MP’s: fear, anger, revenge, 
etc.262; emotions that likely passed over the rest of the compound not involved in the riot, 
such as where SGT Darby worked. The problem with this assumption; however, is that it 
does not explain why SPC Wisdom, an MP, spoke up to his team leader against the 
abuse, or why file clerk SPC England participated in the abuse while she was not 
involved with the riot earlier in the day. What does apply to all the abusers in Tier 1A, is 
engaging in hyperintense actions and giving up concern for the past or present. Zimbardo 
sums up these behaviors at Abu Ghraib: “Actors become immersed in their high-intensity 
physical actions without rational planning or regard for consequences. The past and 
future give way to an immediate-present, hedonistic time perspective. It is a mind space 
in which emotion rules reason, and constraints on passion are loosened.”263  Furthermore, 
the poor living conditions and long, monotonous days caused many guards to lose moral. 
One MP officer at Abu Ghraib stated: “I feel, and my soldiers feel, that we’re just sitting 
out there, waiting to die.”264  Lastly, pawning off responsibility was easy to do when the 
environment lacked accountability. As SSG Frederick described, “No one was listening 
to my position. It was clear there was no accountability.”265  It is difficult to prove that 
there was more accountability elsewhere in the Abu Ghraib compound; however, Tier 1A 
was notorious for its secrecy and mysterious comings and goings of OGA agents.     
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D. FAMILY OBLIGATIONS 
Having family responsibilities has proven to have a profound impact on both why 
some individuals join terrorist organizations, and why some specifically do not, as 
evidenced by Horgan and Cragin’s work. With that said, one might conclude that when 
looking at family obligations of the abusers and whistleblowers, the results may conclude 
that family obligation either promotes or deters abuse.  
1. Testing Family Obligations against the My Lai Case Study 
It is difficult to find biographies on many of the men involved in My Lai since 
there were so many; however, information on the personal lives of 2LT Calley and CAPT 
Medina are more readily available. At the time of My Lai, 2LT Calley was not married, 
nor had children; at the time of prosecution, 2LT Calley had a girlfriend, a dog, and a 
fish,266 but did not marry or have children until years later. CAPT Medina, however, was 
married, but with no accounts of children.267  CWO Thompson, at the time of My Lai, 
was married with two young sons.268  A lack of information exists on Ron Ridenhour’s 
family life. 
2. Testing Family Obligations against the Abu Ghraib Case Study 
Although CPL Graner did have 2 children, he was divorced years before Abu 
Ghraib and at the time of the scandal,269 was having an extramarital affair with PFC 
England, who was married.270  PFC England ended up divorced from her marriage and 
pregnant with CPL Graner’s child.271  SGT Frederick was also married.272  No record 
                                                 
266 Bilton, Four Hours, 2. 
267 “Selected Men Involved with My Lai,” American Experience, accessed March 23, 2015, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/mylai-biographies/#Medina. 
268 Bilton, Four Hours, 135. 
269 Michael A. Fuoco, Ed Blazina and Cindi Lash, “Suspect in Prisoner Abuse has a History of 
Troubles,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 08, 2004, http://old.post-gazette.com/pg/04129/313195.stm. 
270 Tara McKelvey, “A Soldier’s Tale: Lynndie England,” Marie Claire, May 18, 2009, 
http://www.marieclaire.com/politics/news/a170/lynndie-england-1/. 
271 Ibid.  
272 Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect, 337. 
 71 
was found to indicate whether or not SPC Wisdom was married; however, primary 
whistleblower SGT Darby was.273   
E. RECREATION 
The idea of recreation as an influential factor in ultimately engaging in violence is 
prevalent in gang violence, yet evidenced in both case studies of My Lai and Abu Ghraib. 
Humans are active beings and boredom seems to naturally drive individuals to seek some 
sort of form of recreation.     
1. Testing Recreation against the My Lai Case Study 
For the majority of Charlie Company, the weeks leading up to My Lai proved 
disappointing. Charlie Company had a key role in the planned mission to hunt down the 
VC 48th Battalion, but as weeks went by, the heavy combat that Charlie Company was 
anticipating proved absent. Charlie Company’s soldiers began to feel isolated, as one 
member stated: “to be honest, we felt abandoned by anyone above us.”274  It is 
impossible to say for sure that the long days and weeks in the field with no enemy 
resistance created an environment of boredom; however, one could reasonably assume 
such. Boredom was a likely contributor to why the men participated in rapes and even 
early abuse; however, the stress and revengeful emotions of Charlie Company due to 
casualties the month before My Lai, seemed to have a larger influence at My Lai.       
If boredom possibly contributed to some of the early abuse, mainly sexual abuse, 
committed by Charlie Company, at least leading up to My Lai, then one must look at 
CWO Thompson and Ron Ridenhour’s situation to determine if they, too, were subject to 
boredom; however, there is a lack of evidence on either stance to show if the 
whistleblowers’ lives as aerial reconnaissance crew were as long and monotonous as the 
soldiers of Charlie Company. The only substantial fact against boredom is that, as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, the missions of CWO Thompson and Ron Ridenhour 
were short, two-hour missions before they had to return to a landing zone for 
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refueling.275  Additionally, CWO Thompson possibly had mandatory crew rest as a pilot, 
another factor that might contrast the long, uneventful days of patrolling that Charlie 
Company was subject too; a factor that is also not substantial enough to validate the 
element of recreation.  
2. Testing Recreation against the Abu Ghraib Case Study 
Days and nights at Abu Ghraib were particularly monotonous for the MP’s. When 
working on SSG Frederick’s legal case, Zimbardo discovered SSG Frederick once 
worked 12-hour shifts for forty days straight.276  When SSG Frederick’s shift ended, he 
would sleep during most of his time before his next shift.277  This blasé daily routine was 
typical. Zimbardo attributed the nightly boredom of having everything under control, to a 
desire for excitement.278  
So is this to say that SGT Darby’s job as a file clerk on the Abu Ghraib compound 
was exciting enough that he did feel the need to abuse prisoners for entertainment?  The 
answer is no and is supported by several pieces of evidence. First of all, one should 
remember that SPC England was also a file clerk, which contradicts the inference that a 
lack of boredom is why the whistleblowers reported abuse. One file reportedly alleged 
that for SPC England, “the evening was a break from the tedium of her job processing 
prisoners.”279  SGT Darby very well could have sought out the same entertainment. 
Furthermore, other accounts of life at Abu Ghraib reveal that boredom from long, 
monotonous days were not limited to the MP’s, such as Aiden Delgado’s recollection that 
“boredom is a constant menace, for with boredom comes loneliness and depression”280 
which supplements his account earlier in this chapter of his peer soldiers entertaining 
themselves by watching camel spiders fight, hunting rats and dogs, etc. Analysis of this 
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element also fails to explain why SPC Wisdom, who was an MP, opted to report the 
abuse to his team leader instead of participating in it.   
F. AGE 
As shown in Chapter III, age proves to be a powerful factor in gang involvement 
and at first glance, may serve as a candidate in explaining the disparate behavior between 
abusers and whistleblowers in cases such as My Lai and Abu Ghraib. The possible 
outcomes of the following analysis were that the whistleblowers were older than abusers, 
the abusers older than the whistleblowers, or a mix of ages. The reader should note that 
age does not necessarily correlate to experience, so perhaps experience is another element 
that should be tested in further research.  
1. Testing Age against the My Lai Case Study 
In 1970, the Army Chief of Staff ordered an investigation into the demographics 
of Charlie Company. The age of the men, including the abusers, averaged only 20 years 
old.281  After initial rejection for military service, 2LT Calley was re-evaluated and 
accepted,282 joining the service at relatively older age of 24.283  CAPT Medina, as a 
prior-enlisted man, was even older at the time of My Lai: 31 years old to be exact.284  As 
a reminder, 2LT Calley and CAPT Medina were unarguably the most influential people 
when it came to abuse in My Lai, even though CAPT Medina was acquitted of all 
charges. This shows a clear case of age discrepancy between the “ring leaders” of abuse 
and those that followed along, or even chose inaction. Now it is time to look at the age of 
the whistleblowers.  
CWO Thompson, the reconnaissance pilot whom managed to stop some of the 
murders at the tail end of the My Lai massacre, was 25 years old; also older than the 
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average age.285  Ron Ridenhour, the helicopter gunner who wrote to Congress 
encouraging an investigation, was 22 years old at the time of My Lai.286  
2. Testing Age against the Abu Ghraib Case Study 
According to the National Council of Disability, the average age of U.S. reserve 
troops deployed to Iraq was 33 years old.287  Interestingly, the age of the nine soldiers 
initially convicted in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal averages 27. Furthermore, the 
highest ranking soldier of the group charged, SSGT Frederick and the “ringleader” of 
abuse, CPL Graner, are 37288 and 34 years old respectively;289 both higher than the 
average group of the convicted soldiers as well as the average age of reserve soldiers 
deployed to Iraq.   
Regarding the whistleblowers, SPC Wisdom, whom initially reported the abuse he 
witnessed to his team leader, was 20 years old at the time,290 and SGT Darby was 24 
years old when he turned in the CD of photographs to CID.291     
G. PEER INFLUENCE 
Similar to the diffusion of responsibility caused by deindividuation, diffusion of 
responsibility often grows from a group setting as well. Involvement in a group, 
especially a close-knit group which is engaged in war, has a strong affect on an individual 
not just to conform, but specifically not to go against the majority. One can see this 
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abnormally strong social dynamic when looking at psychology, engagement in terrorism, 
gang involvement, etc.   
1. Testing Peer Influence against the My Lai Case Study 
Although 2LT Calley was the only individual charged in the case of My Lai, it is 
widely known that he was not a single actor who orchestrated a mass murder of hundreds 
of civilians. It is no secret that many soldiers murdered that day in My Lai. My Lai is 
often described as a “killing spree,” or a “massacre,” as in its notorious name.   
Without a doubt, the group dynamic of Charlie Company created an environment 
that allowed abuse to escalate to the point of rape, torture, and murder. Countless 
accounts of soldiers from Charlie Company recall the tight knit group. One soldier said 
“We were all close, the whole company—I had to depend on them and they had to 
depend on me…This is all we had; this was all the people in the company felt they were 
answerable to. They felt they were answerable to the company commander and the other 
people around—and nobody else.”292  Soldiers, who were later horrified of their 
behavior, remembered being a part of the group frenzy which left so many people dead: 
“I cut their throats, cut off their hands, cut out their tongue, their hair, scalped them. I did 
it. A lot of people were doing it and I just followed. I just lost all sense of direction.”293  
Even the photographer with the company felt the strong sense of the group: “I was part of 
it, everyone who was there was part of it, and that includes the General and the Colonel 
flying above in their helicopters. They’re all part of it. We all were. Just one big 
group.”294  Endless accounts of this murderous group mentality exist among the soldiers 
of Charlie Company; however, was this the case with the whistleblowers as well?  
       CWO Thompson and Ron Ridenhour were each part of a small three-man 
team on their respective helicopters. CWO Thompson, although he had an external chain 
of command, was the senior person in his helicopter as the pilot. As mentioned before, 
even with his chain of command back at LZ Dottie and the leadership that he supported 
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for the group troops, CWO Thompson only had communications through one of his 
gunships which provided him cover.295  With this set up, CWO Thompson, or Ron 
Ridenhour for that matter, were not subject to the external forces of peer pressure from a 
group. Perhaps it is unfair to say that Thompson or Ridenhour would have participated in 
the abuse at Abu Ghraib if they were infantry soldiers at My Lai; however, one cannot 
assume that they would have stopped the massacre either. Regardless, a strong peer 
influence existed among the soldiers of Charlie Company which was not present among 
CWO Thompson or Ron Ridenhour.     
2. Testing Peer Influence against the Abu Ghraib Case Study 
Not surprisingly, peer influence appears to have a profound influence on the 
abusers at Abu Ghraib. As the “ring leader” of abuse at Abu Ghraib, CPL Graner did not, 
nor did anyone else, order the other soldiers to participate in abuse of detainees; however, 
he seemed to take pride in what he could make others do, specifically SPC England. The 
infamous photograph of SPC England holding a makeshift leash which is around a 
detainee’s neck was taken by CPL Graner and sent home with his family, with a caption 
that read  “Look at what I made Lynndie do.”296  His personality created a desire for 
many to want to follow CPL Graner’s lead, and to be a part of his group.    
Now, one should consider the whistleblowers. SPC Wisdom had every 
opportunity to jump in and participate in the abuse when he walked in Tier 1A, but he did 
not. In this case, other element(s) overpowered any peer influence to join the other 
soldiers in abuse. Not only was SPC Wisdom compelled to not to participate, but he felt 
he should report the abuse to his team leader. SGT Darby, on the other hand, was simply 
not exposed to the peer influence of abuse like those in Tier 1A were. He acted as an 
individual.    
With select elements tested against each case study, one can begin to see how 
some, but not all of the elements help formulate an answer to why some individuals 
participate in abuse, while some actively object by reporting it. From the final model 
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formed by these elements, measures of abuse prevention and encouragement of reporting 
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V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis investigated various models from multiple bodies of literature, 
including psychology; terrorist engagement; terrorist disengagement, deradicalization, 
and non-radicalization; and gang involvement. There were many elements from many 
models to analyze and this thesis found 4 elements that provided substantial support in 
answering the research questions. Now that each element in the preliminary model is 
tested against the My Lai and Abu Ghraib case studies, an explanation of how each 
element fared starts off this chapter, followed by the final model of elements which 
“passed” the test, and lastly, possible preventative measures derived from the final model, 
ideally leaving the reader with an enhanced understanding of why some U.S. service 
members commit abuse while others report and stop the abuse.  
A. ELEMENTS THAT FAILED THE TEST 
1. Age 
The age discrepancy between the “ringleaders” of abuse and the remaining 
abusers that seem to have followed orders appears consistent in both case studies; 
however, one of the main purposes of this thesis is to look into the disparate behaviors of 
the whistleblowers as well. In My Lai, the whistleblowers, like the ringleaders of abuse, 
were older than the average age of those that participated in abuse. In contrast, the 
whistleblowers of Abu Ghraib were significantly younger. The correlation that those 
leading the abuse are older may stand fast in other case studies, but the mixed results with 
the relative age of whistleblowers leads to the conclusion that the element of age fails the 
test and is excluded from the final model.  
2. Family Obligations 
As one can see from the analysis in Chapter IV, the absence of family obligations 
does not mean a U.S. service member will participate in abuse. Furthermore, even though 
analysis does show that the primary whistleblowers, CWO Thompson and SGT Darby 
did have family obligations, namely spouses; it is unknown about the other 
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whistleblowers, Ron Ridenhour and SPC Wisdom. This element does not help distinguish 
those more prone to abuse, nor does it indicate individuals more prone to stopping abuse. 
At first look, one might infer that having family obligations may keep an individual’s 
moral standards “in-check”; however, as shown in the Abu Ghraib case study, CPL 
Graner emailed pictures of the abuse home to his family. This element does not provide 
strong enough support to differentiate and explain the difference between the behavior of 
the abusers and the behavior of the whistleblowers.   
3. Recreation 
Although the need for recreation seems a possible contributor to early abuse 
leading up to My Lai and Abu Ghraib, it is not substantiated enough with evidence to 
infer that the abusers had boring, monotonous lives that caused them to abuse for the sake 
of entertainment, while the lack of boredom influenced the whistleblowers to report 
abuse.   
B. ELEMENTS THAT PASSED THE TEST 
1. Sequential Nature 
The stark difference in exposure levels between abusers and whistleblowers is 
profound and perhaps the most influential element in answering the research questions of 
this thesis. One soldier in My Lai made a statement that subtly and probably 
unintentionally points us to a possible solution when it comes to the danger of 
desensitization from the sequential nature of an abusive environment. He states: 
When I saw American soldiers committing acts that would be called 
atrocities if someone else had done them, I began to think that maybe I’d 
been just too naïve all my life, that this was the way things really were. 
Little by little, I began to see that this group of men was getting out of 
control. Discipline was beginning to wear off. Without military discipline 
they were there alone in the country with no point of reference. The things 
that they had brought from their families and schools were far away and 
beginning to disappear.297 
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This statement is exemplary when showing how desensitization occurs when the 
sequential nature of abuse escalates in both quantity and quality. The moral standards we 
learn and develop in childhood can diminish over time when we are in an isolated 
environment which pushes our tolerance of immoral actions in small increments. As 
evidenced by both case studies, a break in these isolated environments has critical impact 
in stopping the increase of tolerance for immoral behavior.   
2. Anxiety and Fear 
Based on analysis of the element of anxiety and fear, it is clear that the abusers of 
My Lai and Abu Ghraib faced higher levels and more types of stress than whistleblowers; 
with the exception of fear of retribution that the whistleblowers experienced. Even so, 
fear of retribution ultimately did not keep the whistleblowers from reporting abuse, which 
is why they are considered whistleblowers.   
3. Deindividuation 
Although reduced social-accountability did not seem to be notably different 
between the abusers and whistleblowers of My Lai, a difference existed among those 
involved in Abu Ghraib. Furthermore, reduced self-evaluation proved largely different 
between abusers and whistleblowers of both case studies, leaving this element a strong 
indicator of why individuals participated in abuse, while the whistleblowers actively 
objected. Strong emotions from a catalyst event, a blasé view of the future and the 
mission, and engagement in hyperintense action all were characteristic among the abusers 
of My Lai and Abu Ghraib.   
4. Peer Influence 
With the exception of SPC Wisdom, who seemed more influenced by the lack of 
sequential nature of abuse from his R&R leave, than by peer influence, the abusers acted 
in groups while the whistleblowers acted either as individuals or as a part of extremely 
small teams, such as the reconnaissance air crews of My Lai. This is not to assume that 
an individual cannot act alone in abuse; however, participation in abuse seems to be 
exasperated by the peer influence of others. Logically, this makes sense considering 
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group dynamics often lead to a diffusion of responsibility. Zimbardo describes this effect; 
known as the “Mardi Gras effect,” which involves “temporarily giving up the traditional 
cognitive and moral constraints on personal behavior when part of a group of like-minded 
revelers bent on having fun now without concern for subsequent consequences and 
liabilities.”298  In My Lai and Abu Ghraib, group dynamics largely influenced the abusers 
while acting alone or in small groups enabled the whistleblowers to report abuse.        
C. THE FINAL MODEL 
The final model is of little use if potential abuse prevention is not derived from it. 
With that said, some of the elements are inherent by nature and their conduciveness to 
abuse cannot be mitigated. In these cases, leaders can enhance awareness of their 
existence and maintain strong oversight. As for the remaining elements, there are things 
that, if implemented or improved, can reduce the potential for abuse and encourage 
reporting abuse.  
Table 2. The 4-Element Final Model. 
ELEMENT ORIGINATING AUTHOR/MODEL 
Sequential Nature  1. Stanley Milgram’s Obedience Paradigm 2. Peers Inquiry 
Anxiety and Fear  
1. Stanley Milgram’s Obedience Paradigm 
2. Cragin’s Model of Non-Radicalization 
3. Peers Inquiry 
Deindividuation   
1. Philip Zimbardo’s Social Dynamics 
2. Janowski’s Model 
3. Schlesinger Report 
Peer Influence  1. Schlesinger Report 2. Janowski’s Model 
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D. MEASURES THAT POTENTIALLY DETER ABUSE AND ENCOURAGE 
REPORTING DERIVED FROM THE FINAL MODEL 
1. Shorter Time in Theater 
The concept of R&R, or “rest and recuperation,” is not a new concept, nor is other 
efforts to increase the moral of U.S. service members on deployment. Recently, the 
Department of Defense has established programs, including R&R sites in major 
operational areas, to provide service members the opportunity to “unwind” in a relatively 
safe recreation environment.299  This program was established to supplement the Non-
Chargeable Rest and Recuperation (NCR&R) program, where service members were 
authorized 15 days of leave back to the United States, but only if they already had 270 
days out of at least 365 days in country.300  While attempts at improving moral of U.S. 
service members are admirable and indeed important, NCR&R has a more subtle, but 
equally as important effect on service members and that is allowing them to return to an 
environment where they can recalibrate their moral standards back to that of society. As 
we have seen in the case studies, this is a critical component that largely defined the 
disparate behavior between abusers and whistleblowers.   
To send U.S. service members home more frequently or even to shorten 
deployments and rotate units more quickly would indeed be taxing on U.S. resources; 
however, if it means preventing another My Lai or Abu Ghraib, then efforts would be 
worthwhile. Setting up R&R sites in operational areas may be great for morale, but it 
does not allow individuals to return to society and undo the desensitization that often 
occurs from isolated environments conducive to abuse. Although it may seem innocuous, 
as abuse as large scale as My Lai and Abu Ghriab does not occur often, less time in a 
stressful operational environment is a break in the sequential nature that nearly always 
accompanies abusive environments.   
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2. Mandatory Defuse Time after Catalyst Event 
As we have seen with the above analysis of My Lai and Abu Ghraib, over charged 
emotions induces deindividuation, which masks all moral reasoning and enables 
individuals to partake in extreme abuse without regard of consequence. My Lai and Abu 
Ghraib have shown us that these over charged emotions occur after catalyst events, such 
as a death of a fellow service member, or an incident in which fellow service members 
were injured or nearly injured. Currently, offering trips to the Chaplain seem the normal 
protocol after a tragic or frightening event; however, this is usually option, as not all 
service members are religious and for the most part, individuals are allowed to grieve in 
their own way.   
Although it would be difficult to measure who was affected by injury or death of 
a fellow service member, or even a close call where one’s self was in harm’s way, 
establishing a mandatory time away from the operational setting would help defuse hyper 
emotions which are conducive to abusing the enemy out of revenge, fear, or other strong 
feelings. It is clearly unreasonable to send an entire unit home after the death or serious 
injury of a fellow service member; however, perhaps enforcing down time at an R&R site 
with both individual and group counseling would be beneficial, if the mission permitted 
it.   
3. Encourage Knowledge and Use of Ways to Anonymously Report 
Abuse 
Anonymous outlets for reporting abuse within the U.S. Government have come a 
long way. As the reader saw in analysis of My Lai and Abu Ghraib, bystanders that 
witnessed abuse were often too scared to confront the group and stop the abuse, and most 
of those who did report the abuse expected or were fearful of some sort of repercussion. 
Analysis of the peer influence element showed the strong social conformity that 
individuals are subject to within a group. Providing a safe, anonymous way to report 
abuse is imperative to encouraging individuals to speak up. Many U.S. Government 
entities, such as Department of Navy, mandates annual training to raise awareness of 
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anonymous reporting hotlines and grievance procedures to report abuse.301  This training 
and awareness of abuse reporting should certainly continue.   
E. FINAL CONCLUSION  
The measures above, of course, cannot be substituted for training, good 
leadership, command climate, and many other factors which strongly influence whether 
or not a military environment is one conducive to abuse. Procedures and training are in 
place to attempt to prevent environments conducive to abuse, yet they still occasionally 
occur, which is why identifying factors that may encourage whistleblowers to stop abuse 
at its early stages is another imperative approach that should supplement the methods 
already in place to prevent abusive environments. 
The potential measures of abuse prevention, and likewise, encouragement of 
reporting, in this chapter are not ground-breaking discoveries; however, analysis in this 
thesis has shown that these means are potential ways to close the gap between abusers 
and whistleblowers by not just identifying factors which are conducive to abuse, but 
factors which encourage reporting abuse.    Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the 
measures already in place is counterfactual. One will never know of the situation which 
was stopped at its early stages, but if allowed to continue, would have turned into a 
scandal as notorious and damaging as My Lai or Abu Ghraib. In the meantime, the U.S. 
Government can only hope that situations conducive to abuse are identified and quelled 
at their early stages, whether that is due to stopping abuse before it begins, or reporting 
abuse at its earliest stages before it evolves into something worth grabbing the attention 
of world media. On a closing note, even though the measures in this chapter are not 
always feasible or efficient, one hopefully has at least a better understanding of not just 
what factors lead to abuse, but even more so what conditions are conducive to whistle 
blowing. We can tell ourselves all day long that we are too moral to commit the atrocities 
of My Lai and Abu Ghraib; however, this thesis hopefully leaves the reader with a better 
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understanding of elements of abuse and whistle blowing, and the realization that someday 
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